Session 8: Confronting Multiculturalism

7th Global Conference

Monday 12th March – Wednesday 14th March 2012
Prague, Czech Republic

Esteem and Respect in a Multicultural Society: A Critical Analysis of Axel Honneth’s Recognition Theory
Francois Levrau
University Antwerp, Belgium

The German philosopher Axel Honneth is well known for the outline of an influential theory in which he argues that ‘recognition’ is a crucial notion to conceptualize today’s struggles over identity and difference. In ‘The struggle for recognition’ (1995), recognition is analyzed as being a differentiated concept which encompasses both the claims of love (love), the recognition of legal rights (respect for equality) and the need for appreciation and solidarity (social esteem). From Honneth’s point of view, a just society is a society in which everyone obtains self-realization because (1) one is loved by elders, friends and partners; (2) legally respected and (3) socially esteemed. Since Honneth’s starting point is always the individual who can be recognized or misrecognized, we examine to what extent Honneth’s complex theory remains intact when arguing that cultural minority groups may request recognition as well. Should these collective claims be regarded as the basis for a possible fourth recognition dimension? Although Honneth considers the possibility of such a new dimension for the recognition of cultural membership, he sticks to his triad on the condition that the horizons of the three dimensions are broadened. In this article we will examine whether Honneth is right to think that way. We will show that Honneth’s triad can indeed respond to a multitude of (potential) recognition claims made by people from minority groups. However, we will argue that, in the context of a multicultural society, there remain some major problems with Honneth’s trichotomy. To be more precise, we will show why his esteem dimension is intrinsically problematic and why his recognition theory should indeed be completed with an additional fourth dimension. We elaborate this new dimension by referring to insights of freudo-lacanian psychoanalysis and continental philosophy.

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Justice and Injustice within a Pluralistic Society
Margareta Hanes
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

This paper explores the ways in which the understanding of injustice serves as a relevant background for the pursuit of justice within a pluralistic society. This approach is mainly seen as a critique of John Rawls’s political conception of justice. The political concept of justice in the Rawlsian form highlights only the descriptive aspects of freedom/autonomy and equality, which hardly takes into consideration the multiple comprehensive conceptions of the good within the context of moral agency. Injustice, on the other hand, is directly connected to a person’s will because it is only the person/group of persons in question who can claim that she/it has been subjected to injustice. The pursuit of justice is triggered by an unjust act. Justice is meant to end injustice. While justice might be conceived in general terms, injustice is a self-defined harm that mainly draws on the person’s/group’s fundamental values.

The paper starts by addressing the question of whether morality should be concerned with justice or injustice and make the case for an account of injustice rather than of justice in itself that is conducive to moral agency. The answer to this question will lead me to tackle the nature of law. My aim is not to delve into a philosophical analysis of the concept of law but to elaborate on the purpose of law and how it can give rise to reasons for actions that guide interpersonal behavior. I will therefore concentrate on law as a normative social practice. The summary of the nature of law opens up a discussion on intersubjectivity, a kind of interconnectedness between persons and society. The interconnectedness requires the need for certain minimal moral rules on which moral and political values are to be grounded. The argument here is that without consistently applying and enforcing minimal moral rules, political and moral values cannot be upheld at an interpersonal level. The aim is to show that a just and stable pluralistic society has to promote those political values that have their root in an account of moral agency based on the avoidance of injustice. This approach is different from the one advocated by Rawls in which the focus is on a grand social vision of justice that promises to achieve impartiality.