The Erotic: 2007 Conference Programme Session 2

Session 2: Erotic Philosophy
Chair: Luisa Orza

Sex and Philosophy
Bob Brecher
University of Brighton, Brighton, United Kingdom

Sex and philosophy are remarkably similar: both are at once familiar and mysterious. But it’s no less clear that sex is one thing and philosophy another. So what might philosophy have to say about sex? If you want expertise, you might go to friends, sex manuals or whatever: but to a philosopher?
Philosophers have things to say about how to think about sex; and about how sex connects, or doesn’t connect, with other things we do. In this talk I want to examine some common conceptions of what ‘having sex’ means. Starting with the arguably plausible claim that having sex is basic, I ask what counts as ‘sex’ in that phrase, ‘having sex’. And that in turn raises fundamental issues of description, stipulation and prescription. Puzzling about those suggests that in thinking about what ‘having sex’ means, we should be asking not, what do people think about these things, or what ought they to think, but rather what it makes sense for us to think.
So, finally, I want to think about how trying to answer that question might impact on what we do and how we do it; that’s to say about the moral significance of questions of what makes sense, and in the area of sex in particular .

Download Conference Paper -

Erotic Actions vs. Sexual Happenings
Mehdi Nasrin
Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy of Science, Tehran, Iran

Davidson argues that nothing should be added to a rising hand in order to make it a raising hand: the latter (which is an intentional action) is simply a re-description of the former (which is a physical event), in which the agent’s intentional states have been made explicit. In other words, an event becomes an action when the agent’s reason(s) for authoring the action are known. These reasons, then, should be analyzed in relation to the agent’s pro attitudes, history and other actions. In this paper, I use a Davidsonian approach to analyze how a sexual event could be described as an erotic action. I argue that if a description of such an event emphasizes the propositional attitudes of the involved agents, as well as their histories, the event can be interpreted as erotic. However, if the event itself is the focal point, it can no longer be considered erotic but simply pornographic. This approach has two striking consequences. First, it shows that if a sexual act is analyzed in an atomistic way (i.e., independent of the agent’s web of actions) it is unlikely to be interpreted as erotic. Only a holistic theory of action can do justice to the erotic. Second, it draws an interpretative boundary between the erotic and the pornographic: while the emphasis in the former is on the agents’ beliefs, desires and histories, thus demanding a holistic treatment, the latter focuses on the event itself and does not see it as a part of a larger web of actions. This final point allows me to conclude that there is nothing in the sexual event itself (or its explicitness) that makes it either erotic or pornographic. Instead, it is possible to interpret a single event as both as erotic and pornographic depending on the information that has been provided for the interpreter.

A Short History of Masochism
Ben Jacob
Independent Scholar, Ukraine

What – exactly – is masochism? Why does this contradictory desire for pleasure from pain exist? What makes the master, dominatrix and slave sources of repulsion and erotic attraction? For the past 125 years sexologists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, literary and film critics have puzzled over these questions and failed to provide a single, universally accepted answer. Freud alone wrote four essays focussing on masochism, each offering a different explanation for its existence.
A Short History of Masochism explores the changing ‘face’ of masochism in terms of its elucidation in theory and considers why, in a culture where certain masochistic themes underlie Christianity, this ‘perversion’ rose to prominence in the nineteenth century. Exploring aspects of Venus in Furs (1870) by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, the ‘first’ literary depiction of masochism, and using appropriate imagery (possibly also performance and demonstration), A Short History of Masochism challenges some previous attitudes towards masochism. It turns away from the received, abstract, ‘psycho-sexual’ approach to consider masochism as a physical experience intimately related to man’s primitive fears and desires. This perspective offers a tentative explanation for masochism’s erotic nature – the mixed repulsion and fascination which it holds for many – and, ultimately, questions masochism’s classification as a ‘perversion’.



3rd Global Conference Friday 16th November - Sunday 18th November 2007 Salzburg, Austria Conference Programme, Abstracts and Papers
Session 2: Erotic Philosophy Chair: Luisa Orza Sex and Philosophy Bob Brecher University of Brighton, Brighton, United Kingdom Sex and philosophy are remarkably similar: both are at once familiar and mysterious. But it’s no less clear that sex is one thing and philosophy another. So what might philosophy have to say about sex? If you want expertise, you might go to friends, sex manuals or whatever: but to a philosopher? Philosophers have things to say about how to think about sex; and about how sex connects, or doesn’t connect, with other things we do. In this talk I want to examine some common conceptions of what ‘having sex’ means. Starting with the arguably plausible claim that having sex is basic, I ask what counts as ‘sex’ in that phrase, ‘having sex’. And that in turn raises fundamental issues of description, stipulation and prescription. Puzzling about those suggests that in thinking about what ‘having sex’ means, we should be asking not, what do people think about these things, or what ought they to think, but rather what it makes sense for us to think. So, finally, I want to think about how trying to answer that question might impact on what we do and how we do it; that’s to say about the moral significance of questions of what makes sense, and in the area of sex in particular . Download Conference Paper - Erotic Actions vs. Sexual Happenings Mehdi Nasrin Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy of Science, Tehran, Iran Davidson argues that nothing should be added to a rising hand in order to make it a raising hand: the latter (which is an intentional action) is simply a re-description of the former (which is a physical event), in which the agent’s intentional states have been made explicit. In other words, an event becomes an action when the agent’s reason(s) for authoring the action are known. These reasons, then, should be analyzed in relation to the agent’s pro attitudes, history and other actions. In this paper, I use a Davidsonian approach to analyze how a sexual event could be described as an erotic action. I argue that if a description of such an event emphasizes the propositional attitudes of the involved agents, as well as their histories, the event can be interpreted as erotic. However, if the event itself is the focal point, it can no longer be considered erotic but simply pornographic. This approach has two striking consequences. First, it shows that if a sexual act is analyzed in an atomistic way (i.e., independent of the agent’s web of actions) it is unlikely to be interpreted as erotic. Only a holistic theory of action can do justice to the erotic. Second, it draws an interpretative boundary between the erotic and the pornographic: while the emphasis in the former is on the agents’ beliefs, desires and histories, thus demanding a holistic treatment, the latter focuses on the event itself and does not see it as a part of a larger web of actions. This final point allows me to conclude that there is nothing in the sexual event itself (or its explicitness) that makes it either erotic or pornographic. Instead, it is possible to interpret a single event as both as erotic and pornographic depending on the information that has been provided for the interpreter. A Short History of Masochism Ben Jacob Independent Scholar, Ukraine What – exactly – is masochism? Why does this contradictory desire for pleasure from pain exist? What makes the master, dominatrix and slave sources of repulsion and erotic attraction? For the past 125 years sexologists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, literary and film critics have puzzled over these questions and failed to provide a single, universally accepted answer. Freud alone wrote four essays focussing on masochism, each offering a different explanation for its existence. A Short History of Masochism explores the changing ‘face’ of masochism in terms of its elucidation in theory and considers why, in a culture where certain masochistic themes underlie Christianity, this ‘perversion’ rose to prominence in the nineteenth century. Exploring aspects of Venus in Furs (1870) by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, the ‘first’ literary depiction of masochism, and using appropriate imagery (possibly also performance and demonstration), A Short History of Masochism challenges some previous attitudes towards masochism. It turns away from the received, abstract, ‘psycho-sexual’ approach to consider masochism as a physical experience intimately related to man’s primitive fears and desires. This perspective offers a tentative explanation for masochism’s erotic nature – the mixed repulsion and fascination which it holds for many – and, ultimately, questions masochism’s classification as a ‘perversion’.
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