Session 4: Philosophical Issues

2nd Global Conference

Friday 13th March – Monday 16th March 2009
Salzburg, Austria

Conference Programme, Abstracts and Papers

Forgiveness and Grace
Glen Pettigrove
Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand

In his recent book, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Charles Griswold identifies six ‘necessary conditions’ that a wrongdoer must satisfy if she is to ‘qualify for forgiveness.’ These include accepting responsibility for the action, repudiating that action, experiencing and expressing regret for one’s misdeed, acknowledging the harm that one’s wrongdoing has (or might have) caused the other, and convincing the other that one is capable of and committed to doing better in future. If she meets these conditions, then ‘forgiveness is commendable because it is what the offender is due.’ But if she does not, he suggests, she should not be forgiven (except under special circumstances), for she is ‘undeserving of the honor.’

Although not everyone employs Griswold’s language of ‘desert’, the thought that forgiveness must be warranted by or conditioned on the subsequent actions of the one who perpetrated the wrong appears repeatedly in the philosophical literature on forgiveness. Indeed, it seems to be the default position in the contemporary Anglo-American philosophical discussion of forgiveness. My aim is to challenge this assumption that forgiveness must be deserved.

I shall argue that the tendency to link forgiveness to conditions of desert ends up excluding an important dimension of forgiveness, viz., its connection with grace. The argument proceeds in four stages. The first develops an account of what grace consists in, offering reasons for thinking it plays an important and admirable role in our everyday lives. The second examines the connection between grace and forgiveness. The third responds to an objection to grace that is rooted in a conception of justice. This discussion highlights an equivocation on two different senses of ‘desert’ that often stands at the heart of arguments for the claim that forgiveness must be deserved (including Griswold’s). The final stage of my argument responds to the two most common defences of the claim that forgiveness should be conditioned on the wrongdoer’s desert. The first originates in worries about forgiveness being confused with condonation. My response builds on recent work by Lucy Allais, Glen Pettigrove, and Jeremy Watkins. The second is rooted in the thought that morally admirable forgiving is something that must be done for moral reasons. Jeffrie Murphy, Pamela Hieronymi, Charles Griswold and others who accept this thought are inclined, as a result, to make forgiveness conditional on the wrongdoer’s repentance. I shall show how attending to the value of grace opens up an important alternative to this conclusion. It points to the possibility that one might forgive for moral reasons (as opposed, for example, to therapeutic reasons) that have their origin in a condition of the forgiver, rather than in the desert of the forgiven.

Although most researchers concentrate on the advantages of forgiveness, very few discuss its negative aspects. In this essay I shall argue that in certain contexts granting forgiveness to a wrongdoer is morally questionable, and sometimes it could even be morally wrong. Following Aristotle, I shall show that appropriate anger is instrumental for justice, and consequently, forgiveness could be an impediment to justice, or even a license for the continuation of injustice.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states perhaps one of the most controversial views in ethics: “Anyone who does not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people is foolish” (EN 1126a4-5.) Aristotle argues that in the appropriate circumstances one is not only justified in being angry, but also, one is required to be angry in order to be considered a moral agent. Given that (interpersonal) forgiveness is the act of absolving the wrongdoer of her wrongdoing, forgiveness seems, at least prima facie, to go against the Aristotelian view of “appropriate” or “righteous” anger, as through forgiveness the offender is no longer held accountable for her wrongdoing, and, as a result, the victim of injustice does not seek retribution.

The reason Aristotle places such a great importance on anger is twofold. First, he realizes that anger presupposes a series of moral evaluations such as someone has wronged me or those I care about, the offense is blameworthy, and he or she should not have done what he or she did. Second, he recognizes that when one is angry at the appropriate object at the appropriate time, one is much more likely to do something about the injustice in order to make sure that it does not occur again. For Aristotle, anger, like most emotions, is a great motivator for action, as one is much more likely to act and do something about one’s situation when feeling anger. Consider a situation where someone systematically insults me because of the color of my skin, say. If I do not get angry, and instead forgive the offender (thereby absolving him of his wrongdoing,) not only will I not be likely to confront him, but also, he will most likely assume that he is entitled to continue to behave in such way. On the other hand, if I do get angry, and confront the wrongdoer, he will be less likely to repeat his insults, and besides, he might seriously rethink the situation and see me as someone who is taking herself seriously, and thus is worthy of respect.

So, the answer to the question posed on the title of this essay is that forgiveness is not always a good thing, and indeed, it may be a bad thing when it poses obstacles to the attribution of justice.

Download Draft Conference Paper (pdf)

While forgiveness and betrayal seem very different phenomena, they are parallel in some instructive ways. Explicating the similar structures of forgiveness and betrayal can illuminate their respective roles in the moral economies of agential life, of relationship and of networks of relationship. Looking at these similarities (and differences) also helps to show up some of the characteristics of the moral domain, understood as a complex social domain. In particular, conclusions about moral alignment and moral pluralism can be informed by the way that forgiveness and betrayal are evaluated.

Download Draft Conference Paper (pdf)