Session 6: Philosophical Perspectives
3rd Global Conference
Friday 6th November – Sunday 8th November 2009
Salzburg, Austria
Love as Union vs. Personal Autonomy?
Michael Kühler
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany
The idea of love as a union between the lovers is one of the most prominent and contested accounts of (romantic) love. Critics argue that abandoning the lovers’ independent identities or selves poses a threat to personal autonomy. For, “becoming one”, the lovers would no longer be able to make decisions on their own, which, apparently, undermines their autonomy. Therefore, the notion of love as union should not be embraced but rejected.
In my paper I want to explore this criticism and, on the contrary, argue that love as union, while surely having tremendous impact on the lovers’ identities, poses no threat to their autonomy. Taking this criticism seriously, I will assume a rather strong but still plausible interpretation of the “union” metaphor according to which the individual identities are subsumed to a shared “we” identity. Likewise, “personal autonomy” shall be understood ambitiously, aiming at the idea of an autonomous self. In this regard I will consider two seminal and contrasting conceptions of autonomy: 1) an existentialistic account according to which we can choose freely who we want to be, and 2) an “identity first” account according to which the ability to make autonomous decisions depends on a “given” self.
In order to reject the above criticism, I will argue that, on the first account, subsuming one’s identity to a shared “we” identity nevertheless has to be understood as voluntarily chosen and maintained by each lover with regard to who he or she wants to be. Thus, it continuously presupposes personal autonomy instead of posing a threat to it. On the second account, love as union functions as constituent of one’s “given” self, defining it in terms of what one fundamentally cares about. Hence, it belongs to the basic presuppositions of being able to make autonomous decisions in the first place and, analogously, poses no threat to personal autonomy.
Download Draft Conference Paper (pdf)
Vulnerability by Intimacy in Love
Christian Maurer
Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand II, France
It is commonly accepted in contemporary philosophy of love that the different forms of love, such as romantic love, parental love or the love between friends, as well as the personal relationships grounded on love, in some sense enrich the lover’s life. Authors such as David Velleman, Harry Frankfurt, Niko Kolodny and Lawrence Blum emphasise the importance of love and loving relationships for the flourishing of the person, her volitional unity and even her moral development. However, love also brings about new dimensions of vulnerability. This is acknowledged by some authors (Velleman, Kolodny), yet in their treatment the point remains too shallow.
In order to investigate the idea that love makes the lover vulnerable, I will argue that the lover can be hurt by the beloved person and by unfortunate circumstances in ways a non-lover cannot be hurt. Different forms of vulnerability will be distinguished, such as vulnerability by sympathy, vulnerability by caring and vulnerability by intimacy. I will argue that only vulnerability by caring and vulnerability by intimacy are specific for love and loving relationships. Then, I will focus on vulnerability by intimacy, and discuss how different aspects of intimacy bring about the lover’s vulnerability. One important dimension is the exchanging of intimate information. A second important dimension lies in the profundity of the emotions involved in love and loving relationships.
Having described how the intimacy in love makes the lover vulnerable, I will discuss some implications for other important aspects in the philosophy of love, such as the selectivity of love and the irreplaceability of the beloved person, as well as touch on some moral questions. These points allow enriching the philosophy of love with new perspectives.
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