Session 1: Sex, Ethics and Debate

1st Global Conference

Monday 4th May 2009 – Thursday 7th May 2009
Budapest, Hungary

Is Masturbation a Betrayal to Your Lover?
Larry Cheuk-bun Lai
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Is there anything wrong with masturbation in respect of a romantic love relationship? While it is commonly perceived that masturbation, or more strictly speaking, solitary sex, is not only cheap (free-of-charge) but also safe (from venereal disease), I want to argue that it is not as safe as it is when it comes to a romantic love relationship. This essay will argue that when the case of solitary masturbation essentially entails the practitioner’s sexual desire on someone else; and that such sexual desire is an essential, defining feature of romantic love, this case of solitary masturbation in effect signifies a betrayal to one’s beloved, in respect of the two crucial features of romantic love: exclusivity and constancy. Whereas there is usually a misunderstanding that consensus and frankness between a couple warrants immunity of betrayal, I will argue that this is morally and logically problematic.

I shall argue, firstly, that when a masturbator is having fantasies towards another person, it means that the masturbator is actually having sexual desire towards that person, and the very action aims at a fulfillment of his/her sexual desire. Secondly, such action and mindset signifies (erotic) love on that another person. Thirdly, given the former two claims being valid, I shall further argue that masturbation of this kind contributes to a romantic love relationship. However, when a lover commits masturbation with fantasies not on the beloved but on another person, the lover commits betrayal towards the beloved.

I will also reply to the following plausible challenges, namely: That a masturbator’s looking for fulfillment of sexual desire does not necessarily entail that s/he is having sexual desire on anyone; that having sexual desire on someone does not imply love on that person; and that having sexual desire on someone does not entail betrayal to one’s beloved.

Download Draft Conference Paper (pdf)

The Role of Sexual Integrity in Defining Sexual Assault
Elaine Craig
Dalhousie Law School, Canada

This paper will demonstrate how in the last twenty years Canadian courts have adopted a more constructivist and less essentialist understanding of sexual violence, an understanding which better incorporates consideration of issues of power and inequality. It will argue that this newly adopted conception of sexual violence has precipitated a change in how courts characterize the harm to be protected against by the criminal prohibition of sexual violence.

There are two major definitional issues concerning the substance of sexual assault law that reflect how courts have adopted the conception that sexual violence is about power and inequality rather than dysfunctional sexual drive or sexual impropriety.  They include how the law defines an assault as a sexual assault and how the law has come to interpret the definition of consent. The constructivist perspective adopted in both of these reforms share the same analytical shift.  In both, the definition of sexual assault and the definition of consent arrived at,  incorporate a new factor into the analysis of the offence.  That factor is the subjective experience of the complainant.

In defining sexual assault this factor is articulated in the newly adopted concept of “sexual integrity”.  The definition of sexual assault in Canada now turns on an objective assessment of whether the complainant’s sexual integrity has been violated.  In defining consent it is manifested through an explicit determination that consent is both a part of the mens rea and the actus reus. Under the actus reus whether there was consent for the sexual interaction turns entirely on the state of mind of the complainant at the time the sexual interaction occurred.  Consent under the mens rea now refers to a complainant’s positive expression of consent not a negative expression or lack of any expression of consent.  As will be demonstrated, these changes reflect an approach that is concerned more with power, relationships, equality and sexual actors than with sexual arousal and sexual acts.

Download Draft Conference Paper (pdf)

Foucault’s Understanding of Consensual ‘SM’ – An Empirically ‘Grounded’ Exploration of the ‘Laboratory of Life’
Andrea Beckmann
Lincoln University, Lincoln, United Kingdom

Foucault once used the notion of ‘laboratory of life’ to describe consensual ‘SM’ practices. He referred to ‘experiential situations’ in which the depolitizising and claimed ‘naturalness’ of e.g. ‘body’, ’sexuality’ and ‘pain’ are challenged via experiential games that draw on ‘subjugated knowledges’ and that develop ‘skin knowledges’ (Howes 2005) on the level of ‘bodily’ experience.

Our ‘bodies’ are socio-culturally inscribed with power relationships, representations and performances of the ‘body’ like for example ‘gender’ as well as ‘sexuality’ only function and/or emerge through repetition and are usually ‘naturalised’.

Within consensual ‘SM’ play contextual, relational and consensual exploration of ‘bodies’ and their changing ‘states’ are practiced which lead to changes of experienced meaning of ‘body’ that challenge reductionist and limiting traditional relationships to one’s body and of `sexuality’. This effectively alters the socio-culturally sedimented and most of the time psychologically internalized experience of both ‘body’ and ‘sexuality’ as static entities. These experiential ‘knowledges’ are crucial in an era of increasing technology mediated encounters, lacking intimacies and empathies and a ‘pornofication’ of Western consumerist societies’ landscapes.

Within the context of consensual ‘SM’ practice traditional modes of `power’ (representations, narratives as well as `body practices’ ) are appropriated for the purposes of pleasure. The reclaiming of  traditional representations and `bodily practices’ that were part of the subjection of human beings within the conditions of domination, through their transformation into consensual games, can be interpreted as representing  `practices of freedom’ in the Foucauldian sense of the term.  “Freedom can be found, he said -but always in a context.  Power puts into play a dynamic of constant struggle.  There is no escaping it.  But there is freedom in knowing the game is yours to play. “(Foucault to Horvitz; in: Miller, 1993, p.352f