Session 1: Philosophical and Theological Issues
Chair: Rob Fisher

Blessing Those that Curse You: On Lonergan, Forgiveness and the Problem of Evil
Tim Burns
Loyola Marymount University, USA

Historically, the problem of evil has two sides.  One half of the problem arises out of human freedom.  Human beings make evil choices.  On the other hand there are what appear to be natural evils.  These are evils that are not the result of any human choice; babies are born with cancer and tsunamis kill millions of people.  In this paper I examine Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan’s approach to both prongs of the problem of evil.  I look to determine whether or not his solution, which is based on an account of the conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity; and culminates in a heuristic where forgiveness plays an essential role in moving beyond the problem of evil, can adequately address both sides of this complicated puzzle.  In doing so I will also examine his three fold distinction between basic sins, moral evils, and physical evils as well as the claim that from the viewpoint of the unrestricted act of understanding the non-systematic vanishes. 

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The Conditional Case for Unconditional Forgiveness
Jeremy Watkins
School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University, Belfast, Ireland

Forgiveness that is given to a wrongdoer who hasn’t shown any signs of repentance or moral growth is sometimes criticised on the grounds, firstly, that is fails to take the wrong seriously enough, and, secondly, that it shows a lack of self-respect.  Whilst both of these criticisms can be met, I believe that they are apt to seemmore forceful than they actually are because they are easily confused with a pair of consequentialist worries about unconditional forgiveness, namely that such forgiveness (i) encourages recidivism and (ii) perpetuates the forgiver’s victim status.  In the course of my paper, I claim that these worries should not be taken too lightly, but that they need to be set beside the consequential advantages of unconditional forgiveness.  Claiming that the compassion, love, and trust which are sometimes shown through unconditional forgiveness can have a transformative effect on wrongdoers, spurring them on to repentance and moral improvement, I argue that a consequentialist case for unconditional forgiveness can be made, though it is at best a circumstantial one.  I then conclude, by way of a critique of some of the alternative arguments for unconditional forgiveness, including arguments that appeal to respect and human solidarity, that such a case for unconditional forgiveness may be the most we can hope for: unconditional forgiveness, if it is justified at all, is only ever justified by the contingent and conditional benefits which it brings.

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Invitational Forgiveness as a Peace Initiative? The Case of Suicide Bombings
Trudy Govier
Department of Philosophy; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada

Invitational forgiveness is a type of forgiveness offered with the goal of inspiring moral acknowledgement by perpetrators.  Like unilateral forgiveness, invitational forgiveness does not presuppose that the perpetrator has already acknowledged wrongdoing and expressed remorse. Like bilateral forgiveness, invitational forgiveness is relationally oriented and has potential for improving fracturing relationships.  Given that invitational forgiveness exists as a kind of hybrid case, there is not an exhaustive dichotomy between bilateral and unilateral forgiveness. Although there has been little theorizing about invitational forgiveness, the widely hailed political forgiveness expressed by Nelson Mandela was of just this type. Key speeches and initiatives by Martin Luther King and Desmond Tutu are open to a similar interpretation.
Could invitational forgiveness, or something like it, serve as a peace initiative?  This question is explored with reference to suicide bombings.  In considering this possibility, particular attention will be given to (a) the distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary perpetrators; (b) the issue of whether third parties can ever appropriately forgive;  (c) public risks of confusing invitational forgiveness with condonation; and, most crucially, (d) the argument that suicide bombers and their sponsors are moral monsters who could never be eligible for forgiveness.