4th Global Conference
Wednesday 2nd May - Saturday 5th May 2007
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Conference Programme, Abstracts & Papers
Session Eleven: Ethics;
Morality and Philosophy of War
Chair: Daniel Blocq
The Mechanics of Judgment on then Topic of War
Kimana
Zulueta-Fuelscher
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
First
of all, is the concept of “war” a stable concept,
which keeps its meaning despite its very different connotations, or
is it only a conceptual structure that changes with the argument? Has
anything substantial changed since the end of the Cold War, or, later
than this date, since September 11, 2001? And, most important, who
judges these changes and based on what, is there any structure of judgment
that leads human beings thinking about war? A differentiation of the
types of judgments may only lead us as far as our reason determines
our decisions. What one can expect of this paper, however, is a better
picture of the indeterminacy of the concept of war, and how some of
our political actors may use its porous limits to manipulate people’s
common understanding, through different kinds of judgments, called
justification in the case of these decision makers.
There are two possible
conclusions of this article, one procedural and the other one consequential.
The first one dealing with when policy makers use a certain kind of
justification, when they judge the circumstances in a specific way,
to convince or persuade the public of their policies. And the second
one, closely related to the first, will be dealing with the possible
and probable consequences of them using certain types of justifications,
who is the subject judging this extreme and who judges the judge. Partly
the response to this last question lies in the term “responsibility”,
but also prudence and practical reason. Living under uncertainty and
still having to take decisions is the risk we confront in our daily
lives. The good management of this inescapable situation lies most
of the time if not on luck, on those three faculties.
Questioning Just War Thinking
Tarik
Kochi
School of Law,
Queen’s University Belfast, Northern
Ireland
The growing use of a ‘just war’ language by contemporary political actors to legitimate acts of violence within the so-called ‘war on terror’ merits the questioning of some of the dominant assumptions that underlie just war thinking. This paper examines a central set of assumptions contained within the popular, modern just war theory presented by Michael Walzer, and those contained within more traditional just war accounts given by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Such approaches presuppose accounts of social violence in which the rightness or justness of violence is already ‘ordered’ into distinct spheres of legitimacy. Forms may include the presupposing the inherent legitimacy of violence against animals, or the pre-given legitimacy of sovereign and police violence to maintain domestic security, or by the assumed natural supremacy of human rights. When thinkers drawing upon just war theory to make judgements about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular acts of war take for granted particular ‘orders of the rightness of violence’ then their arguments often present warped calculations about the legitimacy of killing in which particular forms of present and future life and forms of living are over-valued against others. By drawing attention to the role such presuppositions necessarily play within the moral calculations of just war thinking the paper sets out a number of the inadequacies and difficulties within just war thinking and sketches an alternative account to thinking about the rightness of war that focuses instead upon a genealogical account of the ways in which our notions of the rightness of war are historically and differentially ordered.
The
Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for the Jus
ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation
of Outer Spac
Arjen
Vermeer
Faculty of Law, University of Geneva
Military use of outer space has been part
and parcel of national security strategies ever since the space age
began, almost 50 years ago. Recent developments in technology and military
doctrine have shown an increased interest by States in the deployment
of ‘killer
satellites’ in space. Thus, an assessment thereof under international
law seems pertinent.
Contrary to common belief, the arms control provisions of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty reserve only celestial bodies to be used
for ‘peaceful purposes’, thereby demilitarising them
completely. Conversely, the Treaty does not limit military activities
in the space between celestial bodies, the outer void space, except
for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the application
of general international law, including the UN Charter.
Yet, force application by space weaponry challenges the regime
governing the use of force in international relations, the jus
ad bellum, as spelled out in the Charter on a conceptual and
substantive level. Firstly, the concept of ‘force’ needs
to be revisited. Secondly, the differentiated regimes of outer void
space and celestial bodies have significant impact on the lawful
exercise of the right of self-defence, including the deployment of
spatial missile defence shields.
Lastly, a possible jus in bello spatiale, a law of armed
conflict in outer space, will be examined. The analysis focuses on
the application of the general principles and the environmental protection
regime existing under the current regulation of means and methods
of warfare. Additionally, targeting issues under the law of armed
conflict are evaluated in view of the characteristics of space assets.
Space order is vital for world order. Undoubtedly, military activity
in space will only increase in wars to come. This will profoundly
test existing norms of international law. Hence, a framework is offered
of the norms applicable in the fourth dimension of warfare.