

**The repercussions of the US bullying on Turkish Foreign
Policy in two case-studies: The Johnson Letter of June 5th 1964
and the Troop Deployment Proposal of March 1st 2003**

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Abstract

This paper is aiming to reveal the repercussions of the US bullying on Turkish foreign policy, and to demonstrate the nature of anti-American behavior in Turkey as a product of long-term distortions implicit in a lasting and a structural relationship.

Key Words: US foreign policy, Turkey, Lyndon Johnson, İsmet İnönü, Johnson Letter, March 1st troop deployment proposal, Justice and Development Party, anti-Americanism in Turkey

An important aspect of the Kemalist cadre even before the establishment of the Turkish Republic was the insistence on the principle of national sovereignty. Due to the negative legacy of the shameful relationship pattern of the late Ottoman rule with the Great Powers, the elitist and reformist Kemalists embraced the principle of national sovereignty to decide and act independently on issues related to national interests.¹

Although the anti-European/Western attitude had its roots since 1870's onwards,² the Kemalist movement had the desire to adopt Western values and defended the principle jealously on the international arena. However, there is a thin line between skepticism towards the great powers, and becoming against those powers and the Turkish experience is a good example of being in limbo.

1. The Road to Crisis

Following the Second World War, the US and Turkish foreign policies strongly converged, due to each country's growing tension with the Soviet Union. For the US, hindering the possible Soviet expansion towards the Near East became a major concern. Since US became the successor of the British foreign policy in the region, the declaration of the Truman Doctrine (March 1947) and the extension of the scope of the Marshall Plan (June 1947) were clear responses to the Soviet intentions in the Near East and complying with the containment policy of the US towards the USSR.

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Turkey on the other hand, was willing to renew the 1925 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, by the end of the Second World War. Yet, the Soviet rejection continued with a number of territorial concession demands including a military base in the Dardanelles and the alteration of the Eastern border of Turkey in Soviet favour. Even in the course of the Second World War, Turkey had chosen to act along with the West in general and the British in particular. Although, President İsmet İnönü has been averse to squabble with Stalin; those demands paved the way for a firm alteration of Turkey's foreign policy preferences.

Instead of continuing to perform on a tight rope, as they have done during the war, Turkish foreign policy makers became ready to take their side along with the US. Hence, initiating a multi-party regime, joining the Korean War, taking part in the Council of Europe, and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, applying for the European Economic Community and accepting the NATO umbrella facilitated Turkey's new role as an ally at hand for the US interests in the Near East, until the end of 1950's. Here, ideological reasons were secondary compared to security estimations of Turkish governments.³

A major challenge for the close and complex relationship would be the Coup d'État of May 27th 1960 which toppled the pro-American, Democrat Party (DP) and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and the unsuccessful attempts of 1961 and 1962. Although, the new regime, established by the National Unity Committee-consisting predominantly young officers-, declared its commitment to the NATO Agreement and other international commitments of Turkey, an important line of reasoning of the coup was the direct US involvement in both domestic and foreign political decision-making processes. Along with skepticism towards the US, and an overt support for the national independence movements of the period,⁴ the new regime persevered with the ongoing policy of being distanced to the northern neighbour i.e. the Soviet Union.

The impact of the Non-Aligned Movement, the unharmonious nature of the relations between the US and de Gaulle's France, along with détente between the US and the USSR following the Cuban missile crisis within the context of peaceful cohabitation, the 1963 Moscow Agreement and the stiffening of the Soviet-Chinese rivalry, were the major foreign policy issues when the Cyprus dispute triggered in December 1963.⁵

2. The Ossified Dispute

In 1954, today's ossified problem of Cyprus became apparent owing to the discussion on the decolonisation of the island at the UN General

Assembly. Thus, the island became an independent state subsequent to two agreements signed by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey in Zurich and London in February 1959. According to the agreements, the UK retained two military bases on the island and the government posts and public offices were allocated by ethnic quotas to the Greek and Turkish communities. Hence the agreements recognized the right of permanent veto of the Turkish community on the island, in addition to 30% of the seats in the parliament and administration; and also granted guarantor rights for the three signers.

Although, the three signers were NATO members, the Soviet Union was also backing the agreements regarding different prospects. Firstly, decolonisation of the island would be a clear sign of a victory for the anti-imperialist camp. Secondly, the unification of the island with Greece would consolidate the NATO mandate on Cyprus, yet the agreements were on the opposite direction. Thirdly, the subsistence of the ethnic conflict was giving the Soviets an opportunity to interfere the relations between Turkey and NATO, with a possible Soviet rapprochement towards Turkey.

Yet, in December 1963 inter-communal violence (known as the *Bloody Noel*) broke out. Many believed that the agreements were far from bringing solution to the ongoing problems. On the contrary, they themselves were causing new ones. Thereby, the constitution failed to dispel the apprehension and trepidation that had increasingly divided the two communities. Moreover, the Zurich-London agreements were blamed to have foreign imprint for many Greeks, and therefore illegitimate. Furthermore, they barred the unification (*Enosis*) of Cyprus with Greece, so the Greek Cypriots viewed the constitutional provisions drafted to safeguard minority rights as granting the Turkish Cypriots disproportionate privileges which would be abused within the implementation process.⁶ Therefore, a significant proportion of the Greek Cypriot community was motivated to undermine the constitution, or at least press for modifications. Likewise, the leading figure of the Non-aligned Movement, Archbishop Makarios III –the president of Cyprus- was also disinclined to acquiesce to the agreements and called for unilateral constitutional changes, in order to formulate a system that would retain. However, the main objective of the amendments, according to the Turkish Cypriots, was to put the Turkish Cypriots into the status of minority from the status of co-founder and politically equal partner of the Republic.⁷

For the Turkish Cypriots London and Zurich agreements were “a step forward” as the provisions maintained their security and identity as a separate national community. Yet, December 1963 incidents were tangible evidence of Greek intentions to place a stranglehold on their liberties and rights, against which they no longer had any security.⁸ Therefore, suspicion and insecurity motivated many Turks to declare that they would have preferred different terms than those agreed, such as partition (*Taksim*), of the

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island and unification of its two segregated parts with the motherlands (so-called the double *Enosis*).

Turkey on the other hand, replied with a demarche and convinced the United Kingdom and Greek governments to take part in issuing a statement, requesting both parties to put an immediate end to the ongoing violence, and the Cyprus Government to use all means necessary for their compliance.⁹ Yet, the guarantors' efforts were far from being relentless, so the carnage did not cease.

3. The Johnson Letter

In 1964, Turkey declared her intension to exercise a unilateral military intervention towards Cyprus to stop the ongoing inter-communal dispute on the island for months, on the basis of its guarantee rights.¹⁰ However, late Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's coalition government had been obstructed by the American President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 5th, 1964 via a strongly worded letter which was delivered to İnönü,¹¹ by then the US Ambassador to Ankara, Raymond Hare.¹²

The letter was not only a quick response of the US to stop a possible Turco-Greek war in the Near East, but also a cut-off point for Turkish foreign policy. From that moment onwards, Turkish foreign policy makers had to revise their priorities and recalled the complicated and bitter reminiscence of the late Ottoman era. Although, İnönü's experience on foreign relations had been tested on several occasions such as the Lausanne Treaty (1924) negotiations and the conference diplomacy of the Second World War, the letter had changed the basis of Turkey's foreign policy.¹³

President Johnson, in the letter, reminded İnönü that it is Turkey's undertaking to consult with the US before any such action is taken and added that an intervention towards Cyprus might result in the partition of the island, which is an option excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee.¹⁴

Furthermore, Johnson made clear that a military intervention towards Cyprus could possibly lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union, and if Turkey decides to take such step without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies, she might be left alone.

Johnson also stated that the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to a unilateral action by Turkey, which would defy the efforts of the Organisation.

Concomitantly, the US prompted the military assistance issue-better known as the Military Assistance Programme Agreements (MAP). Turkey received a considerable amount of military equipment by bringing the post-war conjuncture into play. Yet, the use of military assistance for purposes

other than those for which such assistance was furnished was prohibited according to the bilateral agreements.

İnönü answered the letter on June 13th, 1964 and stated that President Johnson's message had been received by his government and the unilateral intervention plan had been delayed accordingly. But he also mentioned Turkey's disappointment as an ally. Although Turkey attached great importance to alliance with the US, the letter made clear that there are fundamental disparities on various issues in both sides. Moreover, İnönü stated that the wording of the letter was considered as it was marked by the time pressure.¹⁵

İnönü also touched upon the legitimacy of such action and insisted on his approach as it is the right of Turkey, given by the Treaty of Guarantee, to stop the Greek Cypriot violation.

Then he criticized the way that NATO would settle on under the US leadership, and said that if NATO's structure was that of fragile and gives credit to the aggressor's allegations, then such defect needed to be resolved.

The military assistance issue on the other hand, has not been referred, as it would be a violation of an agreement to use US military equipment for purposes other than those pointed out in the agreement.

In order to ease the tension and find a solution to the problem Johnson invited Turkish and Greek prime ministers to Washington and İnönü arrived to the city for a two day visit on June 22nd 1964, and the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou arrived the day after İnönü left. Two sides agreed on the appointment of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson as the mediator, yet the fate of the island was far from being definite.

Both letters were kept as state secrets and could not be made public until January 1966. They were read in the parliament in a closed session in June 15th, 1964, on the very same day the parliament gave the İnönü Administration the confidence vote for a coalition with *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party-JP). Later, İnönü's *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party-RPP) had lost the elections and applied for the revelation of the letter. This time the leader of *Adalet Partisi* and the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel had leaked the letter to a major columnist of *Hürriyet* Newspaper and, a strong reaction occurred in the public. A public opinion poll conducted in 1965¹⁶ and the student demonstrations during the mid and late 1960s were turned out to a strong anti-American behaviour in Turkey. It was considered as a solemn indication that the US controlled everything in Turkey, even directed Turkish foreign policy.¹⁷ Former Secretary General of İnönü's PRP and the Prime Minister during the 1974 military invasion on Cyprus, Bülent Ecevit said:

"We realized that our one-dimensional national security approach did not cover all contingencies. We began to discuss whether Turkey's membership in NATO, contributed to Turkish

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security or actually increased dangers. We also realized that [NATO's commitment to our security] would be useless if our friends changed their minds [and did not stand up to their commitments]... We also realized how isolated we are. Because of the [international] isolation, we faced enormous difficulties [in convincing other states] that our cause was just"...¹⁸

The rise of socialism expanded anti-American and anti-NATO attitudes among the university students, intellectuals and the workers with the 1960s, signaled by the publication of the weekly *Yön* (1961) and the establishment of the *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TWP, Turkish Workers Party also in 1961) which were running an anti-American campaign throughout the country.¹⁹ Consequently, President Johnson's response let the enunciators to be heard calling for disentanglement with NATO and set in motion multilateralism in Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, through opening a new path to develop skepticism against the US and a fresh perception towards 'other' geographies, Johnson letter proved that Turkey's economic and political ties with the Soviet Union and the Third World had to be intensified.²⁰

Still, the US continued to be Turkey's key partner in the region and absence of any alternative other than the US compelled İnönü to instantly accede Johnson's invitation to Washington.

4. War on Iraq

The rejection of the US proposal on deploying her troops in Turkey on March 1st 2003 was another milestone in Turco-American relations. Many expected the Troop Deployment Proposal would receive an affirmative vote in order to pave the way for 62,000 American troops and 320 aircraft to be deployed in South-eastern Turkey as to facilitate the upcoming US invasion on Iraq by opening a northern front.

Besides, the US Navy brought the 4th Infantry Division, along with tanks and other equipment to Mersin and İskenderun harbours before the voting procedure put under way. Thanks to the strong unilateralism of the George W. Bush Administration, the outcome was only an example of failure but also an instance of chagrin of the US diplomacy in the Near East.

Although the ruling *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party-JDP) insisted on demanding concrete backing of an international support and legitimacy for a war on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the target oriented US Administration was blind to such time consuming efforts. Not only the largely conservative popular base of the JDP, which brings about a susceptible base for Islamic and nationalist propaganda, but also its

Party Group within the Parliament were far from being convinced for a war, disregarding neighbourly relations and Islamic brotherhood. In addition to the popular disdain, saying yes to the US demands to use force would underscore Turkey's outpost image for the US interests in the Near East.

According to the US policy-makers the tripod was ready. Along with the newly established and convoluted structure of the Justice and Development Party Government (JDP), the right connections within the major opposition RPP, and with its excessive influence on Turkish politics the NATO-instructed Turkish army; the fate of the troop deployment proposal was predictable for the Bush Administration. All is needed was a little bit of 'encouragement' by showing both the carrot and the stick.

Despite having all the evidence, the strong anti-Americanism in Turkey has been ignored by the Bush Administration and its neo-conservative strategists. Both were convinced that the JDP was well geared up for a strategic cooperation with the US in the Near East and especially when it came to the Iraqi War. They might even be right in their reckoning, if the Turkish political arena was under the ascendancy of mainstream political parties.

The 1980 coup d'état had altered the basis of Turkish politics therefore it should be taken as a milestone. The junta blocked, banned and exiled anything leftist in the country. Closing down all political parties, trade unions and many civil societal institutions followed by a state sponsored conservatism of bureaucracy and society, along with an upswing of political Islam.

With the 1990s, pro-Islamic *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) formed the government with the heir of the JP, *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party). Necmettin Erbakan became the Prime Minister until he was overthrown in a twin attempt by center-right and left politicians and the Turkish army. Later, he himself and his Party banned and his leadership became questioned.

Although Erbakan's assignee to the newly established *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party) Recai Kutan consolidated his leadership, the party cadres were split in a party congress between the traditionalists and the reformists. Kutan's traditionalists, continued to acknowledge Erbakan's unspoken leadership yet the reformist candidate Abdullah Gül could not find an alternative other than forming a coalition with Tayyip Erdoğan and Bülent Arınç to establish a brand new party i.e. JDP.

5. The Road to Rejection

Bülent Ecevit was the Prime Minister when the US knocked Turkey's door in assisting the possible US invasion on Iraq. The Bush Administration quickly realized that Ecevit would be a staunch obstacle to their plans on Iraq. In the mean time Turkey's economy was in crisis. Hence, former World Bank executive Kemal Derviş had been summoned to Turkey

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in order to implement a set of reforms that would bring the country out of its deepest crisis.

As a super minister, Derviş used his acquaintance with the high-finance and the US backed position to make the Parliament enact 15 laws in 15 days. Later, his insistence on bringing Turkey to elections had put a stop to the coalition government. Thus he started to search for a political movement that would form the new government after the elections. In order to accomplish such challenge, toppling Ecevit was a priority. With his health problems and age Ecevit was an easy target. His party was built and nurtured under the name and charisma of Ecevit who was a legend of social democracy during the 70s and the symbol of national pride referring to the 1974 Cyprus intervention. Thanks to his immense influence on his party, Ecevit managed to survive the plans to take over the party during his days in a hospital, and immediately liquidated those who took part, including his closest men.

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful toppling attempt, Derviş was reluctant in joining his friends and pursued a wait and see policy until he was convinced that instead of a new initiative, joining the PRP would be in his best interest.

Elections in November brought JDP to power with a land slide victory and a solid majority in the parliament. PRP was the only opposition party in the Parliament thanks to the election procedure. Although, the chairman of the JDP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not form the government, as he could not join the elections due to his sentence because of reading a poem publicly, Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister and Bülent Arınç took the Speaker's seat.

6. March 1st, 2003 Troop Deployment Proposal

Right after the formation of the government, the JDP leaders started their tours to the European capitals and Washington. Their two immediate priorities were the EU accession process of Turkey and the War on Iraq. Due to a lesson learnt from history, along with the EU process which gained a remarkable impetus during the Ecevit government, the JDP would support any endeavour that would counterbalance the Army in Turkish politics. Thus, reforms within the context of the EU process and starting the negotiations process with the US for the details of Turkey's possible role during the War on Iraq were at the top of their agenda.

The negotiations with the US began under the scrutiny and direction of the hardliners in Turkish Foreign Ministry and continued for months. According to Deniz Bölükbaşı who was the leader of the Turkish negotiation

delegation; Turkey declared four points as its red tapes to the US. Those four points were the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime, the rights of the Turkmens as being the third founding ethnic group in Iraq, the natural resources of Iraq had to be considered as they belong to all the Iraqi nation and should be secured politically and legally, finally, the Kurdistan Worker's (PKK) is a threat to Turkey's security and had be thrown out of the region.²¹

Although, Western support for the separatist movement gave way to a profound suspicion in the general public opinion, and the US presence by dint of the *Çekiç Güç* (Combined Task Force-Poised Hammer) was considered as more than beneficial to PKK; Turkey wanted to be on the table subsequent to the War which would reshape Turkey's south-eastern border owing to the close liaisons between the US and the Iraqi Kurds. Leaving the Americans and the Kurds alone at this juncture would be detrimental to the territorial integrity of Iraq, seeing that an independent Kurdish state would ajar the partition of Turkey.

The US on the other hand, was chasing guarantee for Turkey's full cooperation during the military operation and finalise the preparations for the northern front without causing resentment with the Iraqi Kurds and keep a tight rein on Turkish economic demands. Although, the economic aspects of the negotiations were held as a parallel process to that of the political the US side was far from being tightlipped and the details of the bargaining period reached the media in a degrading manner for the Turks. The US press had shown Turks as a merchant in horse trading, or a prostitute bargaining hard, since some billions of direct economic aid and credit was on the table to compensate Turkey's economic shortfall.²²

Parallel with the hastening anti-war protests all over Turkey, right before the voting of the proposal, the reflection of disgrace intensified the opposition against the proposal. Furthermore, all the bargaining and the carrot policies of the US were far from erasing the hurtful memory of, the first Iraqi war which damaged the Turkish economy badly and creating a fertile ground for the Kurdish separatist groups in the region.

Even though the negotiation team was ready to make a statement during the closed session of the Parliament to inform and assure the representatives on the details of the settlement, the silence of the Turkish General Staff²³ and the government's demand on delivering the consent of the President who was opposing to an operation right from the beginning because of the uncertainty of international legitimacy, hampered the proposal.

While the initial result was heralding a majority vote, it was four votes less than needed. The opposition, RPP including Derviş and his small band, and JDP's third man and the Speaker Bülent Arınç rejected a re-voting and created a Gordian knot for the government. Hence, Turkey went out of the picture from taking direct part in the US war plans to uncertainty.

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The result was heralding the clash of the settlement reached after lingering negotiations and flattened the credibility of the government. Although, Erdoğan was not a member of the Parliament and the Prime Minister, he was the Chairman of the JDP, and his party was broken into pieces.

The majority were proud that their parliament stood tough against American pressure and joined the set of countries opposing a war that few see as necessary at this point.²⁴ Moreover, its unilateralism towards Iraq moved many away from the US and warmed the ascending relations between the EU and Turkey.

The Bush Administration continued its plans to wage their war in Iraq, yet the Turkish rejection increased the costs and the duration of war *vis a vis* the direct participation of a state with a Muslim population. Hence, the US discontent turned into frustration and made Turkey to pay the bill by wiping out Turkey's foreign policy red tapes and humiliating the Turkish Army, i.e known as the *Çuval Hadisesi* (Hood Event).

Following the rejection of the proposal, Turkey increased speed in her efforts to fulfill the criteria to start the accession negotiations with the EU and entered the process in a year's time. Therefore, the rejection eased the shift to multilateralism in Turkish foreign policy by bringing the EU into the picture. Still the Turkish government felt responsible and agreed to sign the Dubai Agreement (September 22nd, 2003) accepting the US mandate on Northern Iraq and conceded Turkey's unilateral right to use force in a possible hot pursuit of the PKK militants across the border.

7. The Impact of American Bullying on Turkish Foreign Policy

Granting, the term bullying is rather unconventional in international relations analyses, could be added to the tool box as it refers to a systematic, intentional and long-lasting process of subjection in which the participants are not equally matched.²⁵ Concomitantly, the Turco-US relations bestow an actual basis for bully-victim duality particularly in cases of the Johnson Letter of June 5th 1964, and the rejection of the Troop Deployment Proposal of March 1st 2003.

Those two incidents on the one hand, were crucial in repositioning Turkey in the international arena, and restructuring the behavioral patterns of Turkish foreign policy-makers. On the other hand, despite all the jargon vowing mutual respect, partnership and alliance, the impact of the US bullying became apparent as a *force majeure* in determining Turkey's foreign policy.

Protection and ripening of the principle of national sovereignty was of precedence for the Kemalist cadres reigned until the end of the Second World War. That principle was questioned by the beginning of the Cold War especially during the DP government, and the 1960 coup d'état brought the Menderes rule into play as an unreciprocal, unequal relationship pattern with the US. However, the Johnson letter remarkably articulated that the conjuncture was the determinant factor, and the nature of such relationship with the great powers generates circumstances in which the personalities become negligible. Accordingly, in the short run, Turkish foreign policy makers realized the importance of self-sustained, multi-dimensional foreign policy and national defence system as a vital part and parcel of securing national interests, following the Johnson letter. In the long run, skepticism towards the US and increasing anti-Americanism in the general public opinion, the result was to initiate the baby steps for a national defence industry.

Although the long-term effects of the rejection of the Troop Deployment Proposal are unclear, the short term ones were to bring Turkish public opinion to the top of the list on anti-American behaviour among the allies of the US. Respectively, the JDP continue to tackle the thorny issues of Turkish foreign policy such as the Armenian Question, the Cyprus dispute and the Kurdish Question as part of Turkey's strengthening both in its region and the world. In so doing, to find remedy for the disparities and to ease the unequal nature of its relations with the great powers, and in this case the US, is on the agenda.

Notes

¹ In order to account for the vitality of the principle, the correspondence among the high rank generals and politicians of the War of Independence would be indispensable.

² Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963, p. 277.

³ William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, trans. by P. Demir, Arkeoloji ve Sanat, İstanbul, 2003, p. 140.

⁴ On several occasions the National Unity Committee affirmed their mind-set; see National Unity Committee Government Spokesman's Press Conference, *Cumhuriyet*, September 18th 1960,

⁵ For a detailed analysis of Turco-Soviet Relations of the relevant period see, Aysel İ. Aziz, "Sovyetlerin Kıbrıs Tutumları 1965-70", *AÜSBF Dergisi*,

⁶ In order to realise the position of the Greek Cypriot leadership towards 1963 crisis see; Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*. Vol. 1, Alithia Publishing, Nicosia, 1989.

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⁷ Ahmet Sözen, *the Cyprus Conflict and the Negotiations: A Political and International Law Perspective*, Can Reklam, Ankara, 1998, p. 9.

⁸ Michael Harbottle, *the Impartial Soldier*, Oxford University Press, London, New York, 1970, p. 5.

⁹ Mehmet Gönülöbol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası Vol. I (1919-1973)*, 5th Edition, AÜSBF Basımevi, Ankara, 1982, p. 391.

¹⁰ According to the Article IV of 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

¹¹ The Johnson letter and İnönü's response were published in *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1966, pp. 386-93.

¹² (see Çetin Altan, *Ben Milletvekili iken*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1971, pp. 198-202.).

¹³ Wiener claims that İnönü had no intentions of carrying out the intervention threats; instead he was more likely seeking the US support to work out a solution in the talks. But there is no tangible evidence for such allegation other than her interview with Haluk Bayülken, who was Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs in the Turkish Foreign Ministry at the time (for the details of the interview see Sharon Anderholm Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue: A Comparative Analysis of Three Crises*, University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1986, foot note 2, p. 116).

¹⁴ Article II; Greece Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concern them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

¹⁵ Ambassador Hare had merely twenty-four hours to come back with the US decision.

¹⁶ According to the poll, eighty-four percent of those questioned said that "the activities of the US in regard to the Cyprus dispute" negatively affected their

feelings toward that country. For the details of the poll **see** Suha Bolukbasi, notes 4, p. 523 **from** Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1971, pp. 107-14.

¹⁷ Suha Bolukbasi, "the Johnson Letter Revisited", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No.3, July 1993, p. 505.

¹⁸ **From** Bülen Ecevit, "Dönüm Noktası", *Milliyet*, 26 April 1965, p.1, Suha Bolukbasi, p. 506.

¹⁹ Mustafa Aydın "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36-1, p. 118 and Endnote 65 p. 136-7 pp. 103-39.

²⁰ Baskın Oran, **Ed.**, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Vol. I (1919-1980)*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2001, p. 689-90

²¹ Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, himself had written a book on the details of the negotiations with the US, as he was leading the Turkish delegation; **see** *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, 2008, **passim**.

²² For the details of the negotiations on economic aid package **see** **Ibid.**, pp. 68-75.

²³ **Ibid.**, p. 77.

²⁴ Zeyno Baran, "Turkish Bravado versus American Bullying: A Clash of Civilizations?", <<http://inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol2issue10/vol2issue10baran.html>>, 08.07.2009.

²⁵ Teemu H. J. Kokko & Maili Pörhöla, "Tackling bullying: Victimized by peers as a pupil, an effective intervener as a teacher?", **Teaching and Teacher Education** 25-8 November 2009, p. 1000, pp.1000-1008.