

## **Transformation of Citizenship Policies in Germany: Parliamentarians with Turkey origin**

### **Abstract**

Scholars have mainly examined criteria for membership in a national community and citizenship rights accorded to immigrants from a state-centric lens; the ways in which immigrants lay claims to enact citizenship is rarely examined. However, citizenship is not solely about passive criteria of membership of a national community and assembly of rights and duties conferred by the state yet a political practice that individuals engage in and become agents of transformation.

In that vein, Turkey origin MPs with migration-background in Germany offers a relevant case by their active citizenship and demonstration of belonging by choice to the German society. Hereby the paper aims at introducing an analysis of the transformation of citizenship in Germany and simultaneously explores its active practice –together with implications- by this new group of elites in political party landscape.

The author argues that definition and practice of citizenship is not singularly located at one national scale, but also encompasses the public and individual practice building fluid boundaries at multiple sites. Political actors selected, locate themselves (or are perceived to be) between two spheres of belonging, but also represent solely the German constituency. The Janus- faced political representation performed by target group provides invaluable insight to politics in immigrant countries together by reinterpretation of citizenship.

### **Introduction**

Although citizenship is the most basic and fundamental starting point of a democratic polity, it has been more commonly studied within the field of political theory, where it has been a prosperous theme over the past decade, leading to valuable contributions and new perspectives<sup>1</sup>. Yet the topic of citizenship may have more relevance today than ever before. Indeed, it stands at the crossroads of a major dilemma for advanced industrialized countries, regarding the survival and future of the nation-state in international politics. On the one hand, it is indisputable that economic globalization, regional integration, and cultural cosmopolitanism have either blurred or

Devrimsel Nergiz, PhD Fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology

broken down some of the clear boundaries that had existed in the classic model of singular national belonging and identification. Caglar describes that transnationalism represents “a new analytic optic which makes visible the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration”<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, national boundaries are certainly not going to disappear altogether, particularly if the mass public has a say—as was the case in the French and Dutch popular rejections of the European Union (EU) Constitution—and especially in the post 9/11 world of increasing border checks, finger printing, and visa restrictions for non-citizens.

According to the first view, the nation-state is losing (and should lose) its centrality as the primary frame of reference in today’s global world. According to the second, the nation-state is reclaiming (and should reclaim) its sovereignty in the face of multi-national corporations and supra-national elites and institutions. Whatever one’s empirical predictions or normative preferences, continuity or change in definitions of national citizenship are tightly wrapped into these larger debates. In addition, while the future status of the nation-state may still be uncertain, national citizenship is a theme that has emerged, and will remain, on the front lines of discussion and contestation.

Meanwhile, the empirical study of citizenship is a growing field, and of very high quality, but most of it focuses either only on a single country or on a small number of comparative case studies<sup>3</sup>, or it is concentrated in edited volumes<sup>4</sup>. The case study approach is certainly valuable, and it allows for a better understanding of the politics of citizenship within certain key countries, but it does not allow for a clearer understanding of divergence and variations and their direct impact on a specific group, migrants for instance. There are distinguished studies on changing understanding of citizenship in receiving countries and formulation of the notion in a post-national world<sup>5</sup>. Yet what is missing- or at least embryonic for now- is an analysis of how these changes have influenced the integration of migrants and how political participation of naturalized 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants (mainly Muslim) have affected the decision making, policy formation in their parties on behalf of migrants.

In the following I will first give a brief history of citizenship regime change in Germany, next discuss political participation and representation of migrant origin citizens in German political landscape and then narrow down the focus to give some insights on empirical work gained from in-depth interviews with politicians of Turkish origin, as part of my ongoing dissertation project. The first part below aims to delineate the policy framework in which previously non-citizens have gained access to German

citizenship in order to set the ground for the next part on political participation.

*Draft-don't cite*

Devrimsel Nergiz, PhD Fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology

## 1. Transformation of German Citizenship Regime

By the year 2010 it is expected that in Germany's large cities 50 per cent of the population under age 40 will have an immigrant background, according to the statement in the opening speech of 'Integration Summit' convened in the Chancellery Angela Merkel on July, 2006. The statement also recognizes that it is the government's responsibility to help immigrants to learn German and become better informed about the country's laws, culture, history, and political system. In turn, it demands migrants to demonstrate mutual efforts to integrate to their host society, such as attending integration courses and German courses provided by the state. Otherwise, as an interview with previous Minister of Interior published in *Frankfurter Rundschau* indicates can "integration-enemies" count for punishments leading even to abolishment of residence right<sup>6</sup>. These statements would not have attracted a distinct attention if the country would not have in formal terms insisted on being "*kein Einwanderungsland*" (not an immigration country) for nearly 50 years.

Today, Germany has the third largest Migrant population according to UNDP 2003 Report<sup>7</sup> and neatly 3.3 millions of 6.7 millions are Muslims making up about 3.5 per cent of Germany's population. Turkish Muslims are by far the largest group, followed by Italians and Serbians<sup>8</sup>. This section outlines the political, legal, economic, and demographic arguments within the debate concerning citizenship and integration policies.

Ironically, one of the incidents contributing to the process leading to a liberalization of citizenship law in Germany has been a court a decision prohibiting local voting rights for migrants. In late 80s the *Länder* Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein decided to grant permanent resident migrants the right to participate the local elections. This decision was supported by SPD and the Grünen while the conservative party CDU opposed it. The opposition was based on the argument put forward by Friedrich Zimmerman (CSU) that in German Constitution (*Das Grundgesetz*) voting rights was given to only to the *Volk* (nation) and thus migrants could not be granted the right to vote. This position was based on a perception that saw the German nation "as an organic cultural community, a *volksgemeinschaft*"<sup>9</sup> in other words, it saw nationhood as "an ethno-cultural, not a political fact"<sup>10</sup>. The trend of using migration in party politics in 80s, however, was not unique to Germany.

"In Germany, as in all Western European countries, immigration has moved from 'low' politics to 'high' politics, as immigration came to be a highly politicized issue during the 80s."<sup>11</sup>

Until a decision was stated by the Court, the debate for voting rights in local elections widened to other states wherein the opposition defended

their stance with above-mentioned reason, they additionally questioned the loyalty of non-citizens. Moreover, it has been argued that migrants could approve or oppose the policy in their host society but they were not supposed to decide on that by political participation, as they would leave the country anyway. More interesting, a CSU politician stated that foreigners were guests not co-citizens (*Mitbürger*)<sup>12</sup>. At the end, the Constitution court, in 1990, decided in the line with the opposition and stated that voting rights were only granted to the German *Volk* (people) and this was composed of Germans (including ethnic Germans). The court decision, however, did not exclude the right to vote for migrants at all and conditioned this implicitly with a change in citizenship law.

From early 1990s, following the enlarged debate on local voting rights citizenship for third country nationals, among whom Turkish residents represent the largest segment, has been widely discussed in the political agenda. Due to these, the inspiration to incorporate long-term residents through citizenship gained momentum in early '90s. SPD and Union 90/Greens defended the idea that German pass to the third country nationals, especially for those born in Germany, would enhance the integration, while the opposition lead by CDU/CSU fraction claimed that citizenship is and should remain the last step of integration into the society.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the constellation in political arena, some policy liberalizations were introduced within *Ausländergesetz* (Foreigner Law) in 1990 which entered into effect in 1991. Principally it encompassed only a simplified naturalization procedure for those with over 15 years' residence or for younger non-nationals aged 16–23; while *jus soli* principle remained a wishful thinking, yet. However not radical, these minor changes did lead to a significant increase in naturalizations, and from 1993 onwards, the naturalization rate for non-nationals has shown a remarkable increase. Despite the changes in the 1990 amendments to the citizenship law, that has provided a window of opportunity for long-term residents, it has not changed the citizenship principles radically and a number of problems remained. The total absence of the territorial principle (*jus soli*) from the arsenal of German citizenship policy prior to 2000 meant that, children born in Germany of non-national parents remained foreigners until and only if they chose to naturalize. A significant shift towards a civic model of nation and assimilationist policies had not occurred until the change of government to a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in 1998. In 1999, amidst considerable controversy, the new SPD–Green government passed a fundamental revision of Germany's citizenship law, which changed much of the above with effect from 2000. Naturally, the most radical change in 1999 revision has been the introduction of *jus soli* for the first time in German history to the citizenship law stemming from the third Reich, 1913.

Devrimsel Nergiz, PhD Fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology

The new approach under the Schröder government (SPD), with its reforms in the nationality law in 1999 that introduced the notion of *jus soli* and its (failed) attempt to introduce an immigration law in 2002, was widely characterized as a ‘paradigm shift’<sup>14</sup>. This is attributed to the inclusion of *jus soli* principle to the citizenship acquisition, which could not be thought of for the ethno-cultural model in Germany. The new legislation combined the principle of *jus sanguinis* with the principle of *jus soli*. It thus increased the possibility for immigrants to gain full citizenship in the sense of Marshall<sup>15</sup> including civic, legal, and political rights, although compared to other immigration countries there are still a lot of hurdles to citizenship such as the limitation of dual citizenship. Altogether, immigrants were increasingly perceived as potential citizens, the German nation as a civic-territorial community or a community of GNP contributors rather as a community of descent. According to Hansen:

“It was a definitive break with past practice and modes of thinking. Fitfully and incompletely, Germany is turning to integration, and a key component in integration is the acquisition of national citizenship.”<sup>16</sup>

To sum up, the changes in nationality law implied a first significant shift from an ethno-cultural conception of nation towards a civic conception of nation as well as from differentialist towards assimilationist, “in the sense of politically recognizing, legally constituting, and symbolically emphasizing *commonality* rather than *difference*”<sup>17</sup>. In the section below the concept of political participation within the extent of this paper will be discussed in order to provide a base for the last, i.e. empirical part of the paper.

## **2. Political Participation and ‘New Citizens’**

Political participation is understood as the active dimension of citizenship. It refers to the various forms in which individual take part in the management of the collective affairs of the given polity. There are formal and informal or less conventional types of political activity; such as protests, demonstrations, boycotts or lobbying via NGOs; whereas formal political participation covers voting or running for office in the elections. For the purpose of this paper, formal forms of political participation (PP) will be focused on; since at least within Germany these are the political activities in which citizenship is a prerequisite. Furthermore PP in this form prevails to other forms in its potential to decide upon policies at the ultimate stage from which other forms of organizations in the society will be subject to. Apart from these factors, informal forms of PP are often most powerful when they’re collective. In general they necessitate a certain level of collective identity denominator, and an organization through a mobilization process. In contrast, formal PP takes place within preset boundaries of a political institution, i.e. a political party,

and allows participation at individual level such as voting; while demonstrating on oneself is not powerful enough to create political change even if not impossible.

In terms of electoral politics, a.k.a. black& ethnic vote, there is an affluence of studies in the US and less in Europe. However in continental Europe both with the change in citizenship regimes and demographics of migrant offspring a growing interest for electoral behaviour of migrant groups is observable. In these studies the main concern is to find out patterns of decision making in elections for a party or a candidate among ethnic groups.

Running for elections in particular as form of formal PP goes beyond choosing delegates in an election. Here one can point to the fact that participation of immigrants in the political process of the host country is an important factor in their acquisition of the national identity of that country based on the argument put forward by Miller<sup>18</sup> that one of the distinguishing aspects of national identity is that it is an active identity. Ethnic identities in contrast are of passive character as long as the ethnic group feels secure in a national state; whereas belonging to a national identity is foremost reflected in collective actions, i.e. making decisions, effectuate outputs etc. In these terms it is no coincidence that many of the selected group of respondents of this study are very outspoken and eager advocates of assuming German nationality.<sup>19</sup> So, PP becomes a sort of legitimisation tool in the language of politicians under scrutiny to 'represent' on behalf of German citizens.

Another and more relevant aspect PP for the purpose of the paper is the participation of migrant-origin citizens in parliamentary politics. The gradual introduction of *jus soli*<sup>20</sup> in the nationality legislation and the growing importance of immigrant-origin residents resulted in an ascendancy of attention devoted to migrant origin politicians in European, specifically German political landscape. Academic attention deserved for this form of PP is increasing, but nowhere near it could be, also due to barriers of citizenship if not necessarily glass- ceiling for political aspirants with apparently different than German-Germans; either by name or physical appearance or both.

The above discussion reveals the polyvalent and multi-scalar nature of citizenship with a specific focus on political realm. Citizenship is not just distributed according to passive criteria of membership in a national community and rights and duties conferred by the nation-state. It is actively constructed, practiced, and interpreted through the state and institutions of civil society, and civic actions. Nevertheless citizenship is not always located at a single national scale, as much of the political science literature on citizenship suggests, but is multi-scalar, involving numerous discourses and practices spread between different sites.

Devrimsel Nergiz, PhD Fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology

Beside many other approaches adopted by a variety of social science disciplines to inquiry active political participation of migrant origin cadres in parties, I chose a sociological perspective examining the profile of migrant-origin politicians by asking to what extent their career path and self-perception 'differs' from a 'mainstream' politicians. In the remainder of this paper I concentrate on utterances given by them to the issues of citizenship and their perception on their political mandate.

### 3. Entering the Field

The quantity of politicians with migration background in German national parliament (*Bundestag*) has never reflected the absolute share of foreign residents in the country. Turkey-origin residents compose the largest share of foreign population after ethnic Germans nowadays, yet this has never been reflected to the figures of neither regional parliaments (*Länder Parliaments*) nor the federal parliament (*Bundestag*). In the year 1989 Leyla Onur (SPD<sup>21</sup>) was the first, Turkey-origin member of European Parliament for Germany and in 1994 Leyla Onur and Cem Özdemir (Greens) were the first Turkey origin politicians in 13<sup>th</sup> legislative period of national parliament<sup>22</sup> joined by Ekin Deligöz (Greens) in the 14<sup>th</sup> period. Currently electoral constituency of migrant origin Germans is about 5, 6 mio. among them 450.000 to 600.000 stem from Turkey. In newly elected 17<sup>th</sup> federal parliament houses now 20 MPs with migration background and five of them are of Turkey-origin. In 16 federal states of Germany only seven (7) have members with migration background with a total of 29; 21 of them are of Turkey-origin.

Here I utilize qualitative data in form of, interviews conducted as part of a more general project about this group and autobiographies and/or journalistic interview statement by the same group. For the time being five guided (elite) interviews, each circa two hours long is done. Upon interview partner's choice only one of the interviews was conducted in Turkish; others were in German; thus all quotes used in this paper are my own translations. Interviewees were first determined on their names and then through the scrutiny of their biographies, they are all second generation offspring of Turkey-origin parents in their 30s. Concomitant with their age, they all acquired German citizenship via application and not by birth. Within the collected data it is attempted to come up with common themes spoken out many times by different interview partners or actors for the same issue or experience.

Taking their ages and acquisition of citizenship status in to account statements why they naturalized and how they feel about their political role within the party and parliament signifies a lot on transformation of the notion of citizenship in Germany, and to put it tentatively even for wider context. It seems important to reflect upon how they perceive identity signifiers as

“Turkish/Turkey origin politician of X party” in public discourse and concomitant to this what sort of intra party functions they prefer. By exploring the narrative statements of respondents, I suggest how they negotiate their own positioning, in interplay with the discursive codes available within particular spaces of the society. Regardless of their approval or dislike towards certain categories, in their narrative statements they make a frequent use of them.<sup>23</sup>

A. “Guests cannot interfere”

In the second half of 1950s to fill in the gap of newly reconstructed labour market formal agreements to recruit *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) were signed with Italy followed by Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Tunisia and Morocco, respectively. By beginning of the 1970s, due to family unifications, the ethnic composition of the guest-worker population changed and Turks became the largest migrant community; which has remained unchanged for now. The concept of *Gastarbeiter* was meant literally, since those people were expected to return to their ‘homes’, which was not Germany, after a given time. As ‘guests’ they were supposed to work, produce, contribute to the economy and in return earn money, to use back home. Somehow ironically the concept remained in the language as the ‘guest’ did. Despite many other notions in German to identify this group and their offspring, i.e. co-citizens (*Mitbürger*), people with migration-background/-history, foreign residents etc., all of the respondents made use of the allegory of ‘not being a guest’ to explain why Turkish community should participate in, and be aware of German politics. As formulated by one them:

“...when you are a guest somewhere, you have to wait until the host serves you. You don’t look around in the room, do not take one more piece of the cake, you can only obey to what the host decides for you (...) but if you are a friend or a relative, if you can feel at home than you do all of that. As guest you cannot interfere. You cannot get involved, unless you feel an attachment a belonging. These people [Turks] are settled here they have to see that they are not guests and have to participate.”

Here use of ‘guest’, signifies a call for an acknowledgement of the fact that larger extent of the migrants are a part of the societal fabric. At the same time, the notion serves as symbol for the respondent’s own belonging to German society, in contrary to part of the migrant community addresses, he<sup>24</sup> feels himself at home what explains his engagement in politics “Enclaves and microcosms in the society”, as another interviewee named them, constructed a process of othering as “them” and “us” that is very dangerous for the society and should be ceased by greater encouragement for political participation among migrant origin Germans. Concomitantly another interviewee stated that “new citizens” should “not only interfere but also join

Devrimsel Nergiz, PhD Fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology

(*mitmachen/mitspielen*). On the other hand one can argue that such an approach implicitly states that political participation, and politics in general is a realm for those belonging to a society; suffice here to say that it reminds the statement by a conservative mentioned earlier in here.

A striking example has been the case outlined by one of the MPs, who recalled that he was not able to vote for the election candidates of his party in a district meeting although he was a delegate, since at that time he didn't acquired German citizenship. Another fellow in the meeting, who came from a country within the EU but had not German citizenship, was able to vote. This was the moment when he decided that being active in the party, being a part of the society was not enough. Shortly after that incident he applied for naturalization.

B. I am a German but "my name is not Peter or Petra"

The common-sense usage of 'black head' (*Schwarzkopf*) to mark Mediterranean Migrants, in particular for Turks, in German vernacular has been frequently used in the narratives of my respondents to refer how they think they are perceived at first sight during the elections, albeit grudgingly. When asked about how they feel, when they are signified as *Turkish-origin* in Turkish or German media the response is nearly the same. They all see it as 'journalistic trend' to make the news story appear more "authentic", as one put it; or an implicit "negative connotation" according to another. In that sense it is not of great importance how they are termed, they "feel German", "are German, born, grew up and socialized here [Germany] and thus belong to Germany". The latter statement also underlines strong belief in national identity based upon belonging and culture as opposed to an 'ethnic identity'. A discussion of loyalties to Germany is totally unacceptable and nonnegotiable although one added that he cannot deny some sort of "emotional bondage to his relatives in Turkey". The point where the issue gets more complicated is when they talk about the visible differences, i.e. their dark hair or "obvious non-German names", and perception of "German-German" constituency about them. It does not play a role for their identity as they feel it. However this is what they cannot change it says, their "name is not Peter/Petra Maier<sup>25</sup>" as result unless there are enough in politics with migration background, to put it in one of the interviewees words "the things normalize" they will remain the 'black head' in the party. This remark reminds us to the notion of Stigma by Goffman<sup>26</sup>, where he states that the stigmatized person considers himself as 'human-being as any other', but somehow finds out that for others, i.e. 'normals', he is not seen as equal as they are. Goffman shows, how a stigmatized person knows social 'standards' and is appalled with the internal assurance what for others is wrong with them<sup>27</sup>.

Among the interviewed politicians there were two sorts of coping strategy with prejudices based upon their appearance as a signifier for their migration background. One of them is to conceive the experience of coming

from a migrant family complemented by a relevant education to use it as an asset for the function within the party. Interviewees in this group act as spokesman for migration related themes in the party. According them it is “logical” to nominate them, as they have the language skills and expertise in that, but with the addition that they wished that their number in the parties increased so that it is “normal that they also act as spokesman for other realms” instead of being a “spot of colour”. Another group on the other hand is strongly opposed to act as a spokesman on migration, exactly because they have migration background. They make an explicit statement that it is “inappropriate” if not “wrong” to choose people with migration background for this post; although this might be the “one and only post one can get for the time being as a less experienced politician with migration background,” the interviewee states that “migrants in the parties will be instrumentalized” when they take these posts. Furthermore it is “politically more efficient and also of great symbolic worth” when parties are brave enough to appoint “a tall blond German woman” for this post. Beyond this rejection of a post related to migrations, these statements also link in most of the interviewees to a hesitance being perceived as “a lobbyist for migrants and/or Turks”. They crave for posts in at the core of politics such as finance for instance, so to say realms in high-politics. As they argue that only in this way they claim to be able to “exist” within the party.

In respect to how they think they will be perceived, a common ground is that due to their names or appearance it is still to expect that they are seen as “different” this is also related to the scarcity of their number. As part of their self-perception they are “as German as any other in the parliament”, since they “are born and socialized in this country”; the fact that they have “foreign parents” or having no German names makes them not less German. Having said that one has to add that the coping strategy in respect to the functions within the with their visible differences, composes on the one hand as using this background as an asset while others try to *neutralize* it by distancing themselves from relevant topics in party politics. What is interesting though is the common concern of being seen as “lobbyists for Turks”, “representatives of victims” or “exotics” in politics.

### Conclusion

In this article aimed to provide a brief history of transformation in German citizenship within the last decade and its reflections in political party landscape through the output gained in in-depth interviews with MPs with Turkish background. In doing that the goal was to shed light on how they perceive their position as representatives of German electoral constituency. Such a type of political participation within the context of the paper was selected based on the argument that participation in electoral politics is an

Devrimsel Nergiz, PhD Fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology

explicit statement about the attachment to the given society. Concomitant to this argument the interviews have shown that politicians indeed see this as a way to show that they belong to this society, and that not only for themselves but also an advice for migrant communities. Another finding in relation to the changing nature of citizenship in Germany is the adoption of *jus soli* principle that brings in a cultural aspect to citizenship as opposed to the ethnic/primordial premise embodied by *jus sanguinis* principle that stresses a transfer of citizenship only through kinship. Empirical study reflects that among second generation migrants interviewed German identity has been strongly identified with their place of birth-Germany- and their socialization in this society whereas their ethnic bounds is only a part that is enriching their Germanness.

Their experiences are not interpreted *only* through the narratives of these Turkishness or their origins, of course, but through a variety of other discourses salient in different aspects of their party careers. Furthermore, the interview situations in which the accounts are elicited also provide an additional structuring context in which reinterpretations are made. The respondent's articulations of their experiences can be seen, therefore, as complex, multifaceted and situational constructions.

Institutions, such as the political parties and mandates in parliaments as I have outlined here, are not 'empty' or 'value free' spaces in which contestations over collectivity are played out, but are themselves important structuring sites, exerting a constitutive impact upon the identities produced. Interview partners in the project assign a multitude of meanings to the signifier 'Migrant-origin', even if they deny mobilizing consciously around politically and professionally. They are aware that this signifier plays, and will play, a continuous role in outsiders' perceptions about them whereas they prefer to see that signifier just and solely as an enrichment of their assets. No more, no less.

## <sup>1</sup>Notes

Books: **Benhabib, S.** (2002) *Citizens, residents, and aliens in a changing world: political membership in the global era*, in: U. Hedetoft & M. Hjort (Eds) *Postnational Self*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.; **Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman** (eds) (2000). *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. **Miller, David**(2000) *Citizenship and National Identity* (Polity Press, Cambridge).

<sup>2</sup> E-Article: Çağlar, A.S. (2001) "Constraining metaphors and the transnationalization of spaces in Berlin", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(4): 601\_13

<sup>3</sup> Books: **Brubaker, Rogers**.1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. **Rubio-Marín, Ruth**. 2000. *Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Books: **Hansen, Randall and Weil, Patrick** (2001) *Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU*. Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave; **Hanagan, M. and C. Tilly**, eds. 1999 *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publications

<sup>5</sup> Book Chapter: **Cinar, D.** 1994 "From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of Transition." In *From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*. Ed. R. Baubock. Aldershot, UK Avebury. Pp. 49-72. **Aleinikoff, T. A.** 2000 "Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy." In *From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World* Ed. T. A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer. Washington, DC Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. 119-172. Book: **Joppke, C.** *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. **Soysal, Y.** 1994. *Limits of Citizenship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>6</sup> Online newspaper edition: *Frankfurter Rundschau* "[Reform des Ausländer- und Einbürgerungsrechts bringt weitere Verschärfungen für Migranten](#)" accessed on 25 February 2008

<sup>7</sup> In first rank is United States of America with 34.988.000 people followed by Russian Federation and Germany with 13.259.000 and 7.349.000

<sup>8</sup> See official website of Federal Ministry of Interior, Germany. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Startseite.html> accessed on 01 October 2009

<sup>9</sup> Book: **Geddes, Andrew.** (2003). *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London: Sage.

<sup>10</sup> Book: **Brubaker, Rogers**.1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. page 1.

<sup>11</sup> E-Article: Faist, T. (2004) "Towards a Political Sociology of Transnationalization. The State of the Art in Migration Research", *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 45:331-366.

<sup>12</sup> Book: **D'Amato, G.** 2001. *Vom Ausländer zum Bürger : der Streit um die politische Integration von Einwanderern in Deutschland, Frankreich und der Schweiz*. Münster: Lit. on page 88.

<sup>13</sup> Whereas less than a decade later the same government assumed that naturalisation promotes integration see article by **Hansen, Randall**. 2003. "Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons", *The Political Quarterly* 74 (1): 25–38.

<sup>14</sup> E-Article: **Böcker Anita and Thränhardt D.** "Multiple citizenship and naturalization: An evaluation of German and Dutch policies", *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, Vol. (7):1, 71-94; Book: **Süssmuth, Rita**. 2006. *Migration and Integration: Testfall für unsere Gesellschaft*. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag (dtv), München.

<sup>15</sup> Book: **Marshall, T. H.** (1965). *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Garden City, NY: Anchor.

<sup>16</sup> E-Article: **Hansen R.** 2003. "Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons", *The Political Quarterly* 74 (1): 25–38. p36

<sup>17</sup> See **Brubaker** 2001 (ibid)p 539

<sup>18</sup> Book: **Miller, D.** (1995) *On Nationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>19</sup> Empirical evidences provided in this text rely on my ongoing PhD project on "Political Recruitment and Career Paths of Migrant Origin MPs in Germany" (working title).

<sup>20</sup> Jus soli is the Latin concept for (citizenship) rights which are acquired as a result of one's place of birth and/or residence.

<sup>21</sup> Social Democratic Party

<sup>22</sup> The author hereby wants to correct the common mistake in academic field that Özdemir has been the first MP with Turkey origin in 1994. For some inexplicable reasons both journalistic and academic (that apparently rely on journalistic accounts) oversee the fact that another Turkey origin person, a woman i.e. Leyla Onur was member of the same parliament.

<sup>23</sup> Taking into account the low number of interviews and incompleteness of the larger project of which this paper relies on the author appreciates reader to treat the analysis with due care.

<sup>24</sup> For the purpose of clarity the author uses "he" as a personal pronoun for all respondents. It does correspond to the correct gender.

<sup>25</sup> These are typical German names that interviewees choose to refer to German politicians without migration background

<sup>26</sup> Book: Goffman E. [1963] (1967). *Stigma. Über Techniken der Bewältigung beschädigter Identität*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 16