

The Myth of the Hundred Years' Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century

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Abstract

In *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi described the period between 1815 and 1914 as the “Hundred Years’ Peace.” Indeed, relative to previous and subsequent centuries, battlefield deaths were considerably lower between the Napoleonic and Great Wars. The European Great Powers’ reluctance to go war, Polanyi suggested, was due to the growing interdependence generated by the new capitalist system – what he termed “market society”. However, applying a different sociological theory of war - one that does not reduce the significance of war to battle death tolls, but rather considers wars’ qualitative geopolitical and social significances - establishes a new framework through which we can better understand this ‘peaceful’ 19th century. Furthermore, we should expand the frame of reference beyond the European stage as the globalizing trajectory of capital in this period brought non-European regions into a unifying economic world system. Wars in the periphery of the system at this time would therefore have greater significance and would further qualify Polanyi’s thesis. The assumption that the 19th century was a uniquely pacified society undermines our ability to understand the crucial links between war, society, and economics in the present era, and needs to be reassessed using new theoretical tools and insights.

Keywords

war, nineteenth century, geopolitics, world systems, transnational capitalism, imperialism, Karl Polanyi, military

Since 1953, the end of the Korean War, the 'Global North' has been at peace with itself. The Cold War never led to World War III. Europe let its economic interdependence trump its historic political and ethnic differences toward the creation of the E.E.C. and the E.U.¹ International Relations theorists, raised in the era of nuclear deterrence and superpower, have debated whether this peace was caused by market integration,² democratic-peace,³ balance-of-power, or American hegemony.⁴ Interest in the causes of war and peace clearly has instrumental purposes: what are we doing right? Can we keep doing it, do it in more places, or realize when we have stopped doing it?⁵ Though this effort is not in vain if it can help prevent inter-state war between the 'Great Powers' - many of which have nuclear weapons capability - a picture of the post-war period as an era of world peace is clearly off the mark. The division between East and West Europe and North and South Korea ended the era of 'hot' world wars, but was followed, not by a 'Cold War,' but by what Niall Ferguson terms, "The Third World's War."⁶ The United States, the Soviet Union, China, and other 'advanced' nations never ceased fighting each other via proxy wars, which were safe in so far as they did not disrupt the global balance-of-power. The Third World's War was fought by the likes of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Derg in Ethiopia, and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. To the millions in these 'developing' nations who fell victim to these wars, the notion of a post-war peace might sound ludicrous and grotesque.

Yet this is precisely the way we tend to perceive the 19th century in history. Between the Napoleonic Wars (which belong to the 18th century) and World War I (which belongs to the 20th) there lies "a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years' peace - 1815-1914."⁷ So stated Karl Polanyi in 1944 amidst the ruins of that very civilization. An economic historian concerned with the social ramifications of what he called 'market-society,' Polanyi began his *magnum opus*, *The Great Transformation*, with the puzzle of this unusual peace. 19th century civilization, he said, rested on four institutional pillars - the balance-of-power system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state. Two of these institutions were political, two were economic. In another configuration, two were domestic and the other two were international. The hundred years' peace was maintained by the international balance-of-power political system and the international economy maintained through the gold standard. Though the breakdown of these systems were the proximate causes of World Wars I and II, Polanyi considered

the domestic political-economic configuration of the self-regulating market, artificially maintained by the liberal state, to be the underlying root cause of the seemingly stable, but ultimately superficial 19th century civilization.⁸

Polanyi has not been alone in suggesting the concept of a 19th century peace.⁹ Indeed, in terms of average battle durations, battle deaths per year, and a host of other statistical criteria, 19th century Europe does not rate with either the 18th or the 20th century versions of itself.¹⁰ As Polanyi figures it – “apart from the Crimean War – a more or less colonial event - England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia were engaged in war among each other for altogether only eighteen months,” compared to an average of sixty to seventy years of major wars in the 17th and 18th centuries.¹¹ Though Polanyi does not provide his data sources, the proportions of his facts seem to bear out according to his criteria. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Great Powers were involved in war 94% and 78% of the time, respectively, compared to 40% of the time in the 19th century (including the Napoleonic Wars of 1800-1815).¹² If we focus on wars *between* Polanyi’s ‘Great Powers’ - the Austro-Sardinian War (1848-49), the Roman Republic War (1849), The War of Italian Unification (1859), The Seven Weeks War (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) amounted to a total of 17.7 months.¹³

However, before accepting Polanyi’s claim outright, his calculation needs to be examined further. For one, there is no reason why the Crimean War should be left out – it was not “a colonial event,” as Polanyi suggested, but was rather one of the century’s most significant wars, involving Britain, France, and Turkey against Russia. The war dramatically shifted the balance-of-power as Austria-Hungary became isolated from the Holy Alliance;¹⁴ Russia stalled its persistent incursion through the Caucasus and Black Sea in the hopes of seizing Constantinople;¹⁵ while Britain preserved the Ottoman Empire and its communications network to India. As Winfried Baumgart suggests, “if the fighting had carried on during 1856, the First World War would then have taken place 60 years earlier.”¹⁶ Adding this conflict’s 28.3 months back into the calculation brings the ‘Great Power’ total to 46.0 months – nearly 4 years. This is still a long shot from previous centuries’ 60 to 70 years of major wars.

But, Polanyi’s six powers, while the greatest, were not the only European, or ‘Western’ powers during this period as states declined out of, or entered into the core inter-state system. One could add the Ottoman Empire

(Turkey), Holland, Spain, the United States, Japan, and China by the end of the period. Wars between these twelve powers would yield an additional 95 months of war between 'Western' powers.¹⁷ Finally, if one adds all of the wars that were not *between* these powers, but involved one or more of the powers against weaker states, like the newly independent Latin American¹⁸ or Balkan states¹⁹ an additional 125.5 'nation-months' of war can be accounted for. Adding colonial wars by these powers against non-state actors yields an astonishing additional 790.8 months. All of these figures combined amounts to approximately 88.11 years of war in which major powers were involved. There is no way to characterize states as peaceful during this period of time. They were involved in nearly constant preparation for, and execution of, war at home or abroad. Using a slightly different data set from 1648-1989, Kalevi Holsti determined that the ninety-nine years after the Congress of Vienna had only a 13% lower occurrence rate of war than the previous period - one war every 3.3 years compared to one every 2.8 years.²⁰

Yet, Holsti notes:

Except for the three brief wars of German nation-building and Russia's armed interventions into Hungary and Poland at mid-century, the center of Europe running from London, through Paris, Berlin, and Vienna constituted a significant zone of peace.²¹

Indeed, this was part of Polanyi's point. Rather than peace between powers, one can think of 'pacified regions' upon which a transnational economy could take place. Several sociologists have noted the way the war-making nation-state in this period "caged" citizens within boundaries.²² Anthony Giddens, employing some of Foucault's categories, suggested that this was due, in part, to a routinized system of surveillance which allowed for an externalization of military functions.²³ "It involves...not the decline of war but a concentration of military power 'pointing outwards' towards other states in the nation-state system."²⁴

Yet, during the 19th century, the military was still called up during labor and bread riots, fought irregular revolutionaries, and was only gradually

supplemented by (not replaced by) police and paramilitary forces.²⁵ Polanyi described the first third of the hundred years' peace, as being under the firm grip of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria, and Russia): "Its armies were roaming up and down Europe putting down minorities and repressing majorities."²⁶ This was partially true within the territories they were responsible for, which included the minimally militarized remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. The army did not exist solely for repressive purposes, however, nor could a military achieve such ends without political and legislative mechanisms in the form of local concessions and alliances between middle classes (*Bürgerlich*) and *old regime* nobles and patricians.²⁷ Still, Giovanni Arrighi, following Polanyi, described the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe, the two primary diplomatic mechanisms to emerge from the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, as "an instrument of British governance of the continental balance of power."²⁸ While the novelty of the post-Napoleonic international system, arranged primarily through Prince Metternich of Austria, was a commitment toward domestic order,²⁹ Britain was actually notably absent from Continental diplomatic issues and spent most of the period consolidating its overseas empire.

Jeremy Black outlined the three main functions of the military in the 19th century: international, domestic and colonial.³⁰ The weaponry, organizational systems, logistics and communications employed were similar, but in the case of domestic conflict, for example, the fighting took place in urban environments, quite different from the traditional open field battles of previous eras. Colonial action consumed much of the military's attention, particularly in Britain and France – the two dominant colonial powers throughout the period. Michael Mann suggested that many colonial conflicts, such as those against the Zulu, the Mahdi, and the Sheriffians were often considered "war games" by military staffs in which new technologies could be experimented with and opportunities for promotion could be determined.³¹ The British empire grew at an average annual pace of about 100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865,³² and by the 20th century held a quarter of the world's land surface and nearly the same proportion of the world's population.³³

Though Lenin, adapting J.A. Hobson's 'surplus capital' theory,³⁴ considered imperialism to be driven by the economic necessity of incorporating 'outside' markets into the capitalist 'inside,'³⁵ materialist considerations were not *always* dominant for the imperial players. As the Golden Age of capitalist growth

(1848-1873)³⁶ settled into its deflationary and big industrial phase,³⁷ imperialism had become a cultural necessity. Missionaries, who had been an active element in the unique British impulse to export millions of its citizens to the corners of the Earth, involved themselves in such humanitarian missions as the banning of *suttee* (the ceremonial immolation of widows) in India, ending the Atlantic and Arabic slave trade, and exploring the 'dark heart of Africa' around Lake Victoria and the Mountains of the Moon in advance of 'Christian civilization.'³⁸ Though British military support was never removed from material considerations, the Empire was not always cost-effective. Some happy accidents like the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa (which led to the Boer War of 1899-1902)³⁹ had demonstrated to Cecil Rhodes and others - no territory, however barren, should be left unclaimed. As other powers, notably Germany and Russia, began encroaching on key regions, especially those along communications routes, 'geopolitical imperialism,'⁴⁰ that is, imperialism for its own sake, became the order of the day.

The cultural context of 19th century imperialism cannot be underrated. In *Lords of Human Kind*, V.G. Kiernan described the manner in which racist attitudes developed in every region of the world where the Europeans came in contact with native peoples.⁴¹ In some areas like the South Seas this led to an idealized image of the 'noble savage.' Elsewhere, as in the Sudan, the "horror and human depravity" of the "witches' brew of African primitivism and Muslim fanaticism" caused the British to engage in acts of violence equivalent in ruthlessness and self-righteousness.⁴² At the battle of Omdurman (1898), the Anglo-Egyptian forces used Maxim machine guns to slaughter up to 95% of the 52,000 dervishes with a loss of only 48 British soldiers.⁴³ General Kitchener followed up the battle by desecrating the Mahdi leader's tomb and carrying off his skull.⁴⁴ Though some native races, such as the Zulus under Shaka, became idealized to portray the colonials as having put up a fight, most were considered 'child-races.' As the century went on, race-thinking was used to scientifically justify the treatment and confiscation of property from weaker peoples.⁴⁵ In the 20th century, this race-thinking was applied back upon Europe itself.

Victorian Society, a label which Peter Gay applied not just to British, but to German, American, and French civilization as well, was not the prim, proper, and static world of top hats and zoos.⁴⁶ Rather, the men who preached individualism and pious responsibility employed alibis for their psychological repression in the form of scientific racism inspired by Herbert Spencer's evolutionism. Imperial chauvinism took Bonapartist form in the likes of Theodore

Roosevelt, Napoleon III, and Bismarck. Even the women, who were more imprisoned by patriarchy in this period than, perhaps, any other, took their aggression out on those they did have authority over: the household servants and the children. Perhaps, along with ‘surplus capital,’ those citizens of pacified Europe exported to the colonies the pent-up violence Freud described as *thanatos* – the death drive.⁴⁷

Indeed, this was the period during which the process Max Weber described as ‘rationalization’ developed to its full potential. The ‘iron-cage’ of administration led to the disenchantment of the world. Scientific rationality and bureaucratic anonymity, compelled by the tyranny of the written rule, provided nation-states, economic elites, and militaries with tremendous power. This bureaucratic administration was itself a product of military discipline, as Weber and others have noted in the Prussian case.⁴⁸ These military origins precede this period and can be located as far back as the military revolution of the 15th century caused by the technical innovations of gunpowder and the *trace italienne* fortification systems.⁴⁹ State-directed military discipline began amid these conditions when Maurice of Orange incorporated the notion of drill. With almost scientific precision, every movement of the musketeer’s routine was observed and codified so that the entire corps could move like clockwork.⁵⁰ The mechanization and division of labor created one of the first examples of a functional top-down organization that communicated vertically and horizontally according to rank and instruction. The broader relevance of this innovation was made quite clear by Lewis Mumford:

The general indoctrination of soldierly habits of thought in the seventeenth century was, it seems probable, a great psychological aid to the spread of machine industrialism. In terms of the barracks, the routine of the factory seemed tolerable and natural. The spread of conscription and volunteer militia forces throughout the Western World after the French Revolution made army and factory, so far as their social effects went, almost interchangeable terms. And the complacent characterizations of the First World War, namely that it was a large-scale industrial operation, has also

a meaning in reverse: modern industrialism may equally well be termed a large-scale military operation.⁵¹

Though Spencer and other contemporary sociologists saw their era as being 'Industrial' *as opposed* to 'Militaristic,' the gap between these two forms of social organization was not as wide as it appeared to those living during the Hundred Years' Peace.

For the era of two Industrial Revolutions, the impact of war-making and the military-as-customer is rarely given due credit.⁵² For example, in Britain, new coke-fired blast furnaces were installed in Wales and Scotland during the Napoleonic Wars despite substantial investment risk and expense. Both the absolute volume and the mix of products that came from British factories and forges between 1793-1815 were profoundly affected by government expenditures for war purposes.⁵³ These ironworks, in conjunction with the substantial organizational apparatus at drydocks for naval construction, were the prime industrial advantages in British hands as they entered the 19th century. Similarly, across the Atlantic, mass-production of arms by New England factories for the Civil War and overseas export were a part of that region's industrial dominance and were among the early sites to popularize F.W. Taylor's scientific management techniques.⁵⁴ Much of the entrepreneurial innovation in the period was directed towards weapons of mass destruction, by men like Hiram Maxim and Alfred Krupp, and lesser known crackpot engineers enticed by stricter patent rights.⁵⁵ Furthermore, it must be remembered that this was primarily a naval century and the evolution from wooden galleons to ironclads to torpedo boats to Dreadnaught battleships was one of the notable achievements in an era excited by engineering. By the 1880s this development in ships, artillery, rifles, and shells was being accomplished by what William McNeill termed, a "command technology" system,⁵⁶ which was essentially a military-industrial-complex eighty years before Dwight Eisenhower coined the term.

Certainly, rationalized organization was the major development within militaries during the long peace. As medieval colleges in Göttingen, Berlin, and elsewhere codified their curricula to become modern research universities,⁵⁷ military colleges, originating first in France at the *École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr* in 1802, were established to expand the technical capabilities of soldiers. Initially education was only required of artillerymen, who needed

special engineering skills, but the mathematically-minded Napoleon encouraged further knowledge within the ranks. As military theorists like Antoine-Henri Jomini codified the principles of Napoleonic warfare, which emphasized flexible corps and sharp, direct attack, the armies of Europe became academically imitated and uniform. When, in 1871, Helmuth von Moltke led Prussia to decisive victory against the leading nation of Europe, France, his techniques of efficient transport by rail to deliver overwhelming force led competing nations away from Jomini into the hands of Carl von Clausewitz, whose theory inspired Moltke's plans. The change of inspiration was reflected visibly by nations changing from French-styled uniforms to the Prussian dress still sported by dictators.⁵⁸

The application of scientific principles to military affairs led to the creation of General Staffs and the autonomous power of militaries.⁵⁹ This would have devastating consequences during World War I when military strategies like the rapid mobilization schedule in Russia and the German Schlieffen Plan were executed by default without leaving time for diplomats to negotiate.⁶⁰ In the latter case, geopolitics by map had the Germans automatically invade Belgium to eliminate France, ensuring Britain's entry into the war, without the foreknowledge of either the chancellor or the kaiser!

Though the need for technical skills allowed a certain amount of meritocracy to enter the nepotistic military hierarchy, war was still left, by and large, to the *old regime*. The vast majority of officers were drawn from landed nobility and gentry, especially in the General Staffs, which represented a sharp contrast to the democratizing societies at large. The same holds true of diplomats, as Michael Mann pointed out: "Foreign policy remained the private domain of a small group of notables, plus special interest groups advising the few politicians who aspired to be 'statesman'."⁶¹ Routine foreign policy was handled by a small ruling elite, even in parliamentary countries like Britain, France, and the United States, as, indeed, it still is today. Only in crises and wars were outside parties consulted.

Yet, it was precisely at this stage that the transnational economic class Polanyi identified as *haute finance* became involved.⁶² After all it was the members of this elite class of bondholders, embodied in the Rothschilds and J.P. Morgan, who would have to float the loans required to pay for wars. The

international financial class, which owed allegiance to no single government, was, in Polanyi's view, primarily responsible for the hundred years' peace. Though he noted:

They were anything but pacifists; they had made their fortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they had no objection to any number of minor, short, or localized wars.⁶³

Ultimately, the transnational capitalist class was interested in the preservation of the core international markets.⁶⁴ Significant disruptions of economic activity within Western countries would jeopardize long term investments, like railroads, while a decline of commerce between warring nations could amount to substantial economic losses. Even the threat of war could impact bond markets reflecting the credit-worthiness of European governments.⁶⁵ Though Polanyi overestimated the "intimate contact between finance and diplomacy,"⁶⁶ for, as we have seen, the *old regime* still ruled the day in inter-state politics, the effect of financial variables was a real and novel factor in 19th century considerations of war and peace.

Polanyi, however, was wrong to suggest that economics was the sole and primary cause of peace during this period. Cultural, political, racial, and pure military considerations were just as important at various times in deflecting Great Power statesmen away from war with each other. And, in any case, the option to go to war with weaker peoples overseas was the road most frequently travelled. The pacification of the core of the emerging world economic system was an important step in the spread of the Western financial system, but more importantly, the spread of Western civilization. As we consider the instability and fragility of this financial system today, we must recall that one hundred years ago a world war was considered both impossible and probable, as Henri Bergson pointed out.⁶⁷ We must not take our Fifty-Seven Years' Peace (and counting) for granted, and neither should we ignore the violence within and without our 'advanced' societies.

1Notes

T Judt, *Postwar : A History of Europe Since 1945*, Penguin Press, New York, 2005.

2 F Coulomb and J Fontanel, 'Disarmament: A Century of Economic Thought', *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 14, issue 3, Jun 2003, pp. 193-208.; M Mousseau, 'The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, 2003, p. 483.; R Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State : Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, Basic Books, New York, 1986.; R Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State : Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*, Basic Books, New York, 1999.; J Levy and W Thompson, *Causes of War*, Malden, Mass, 2010 pp. 70-72.

3 M Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts I & II', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, vol. 12, Fall, 1983, pp. 205-35, 323-53.; Mousseau, op. cit.; Levy and Thompson pp. 104-115.

4 Balance-of-Power and hegemonic theories are characteristic of realist and neorealist International Relations (IR) scholars. cf. K Waltz, *Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.; K Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, Boston, Mass., 1979.; Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, is also employed by world systems theorists, see I Wallerstein *World-Systems Analysis*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004.; G Arrighi *The Long Twentieth Century : Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*, Verso, London ; New York, 2010.; An overview of hegemonic IR theories can be found in Levy and Thompson pp. 43-50.

5 Indeed, it would be difficult to remove the perceived pacific nature of market integration from the instrumental expansion of neoliberal economic policies since the 1970s, which has, in turn, contributed to globalization. see D Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2005.

6 N Ferguson, *The War of the World : Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*, Penguin Press, New York, 2006, pp. lxxi.

7 K Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2001, p. 5.

8 The notion of the Hundred Years' Peace is not the core of Polanyi's argument in *The Great Transformation*. Rather, the process by which the market economy became "disembedded" from society during the English Industrial Revolution consumes the bulk of the book. The short Part I, about 19th and 20th century war and peace is meant to introduce the urgency behind a proper examination of domestic political economy. The following critique of Polanyi's notion of 19th century geopolitics should not invalidate his seminal contribution to the field of economic sociology and economic history.

9 Arrighi, op. cit.; H Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994; K Holsti, *Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, 1991.; M Mann *The Sources of Social Power vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993.

10 C Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 1990, pp. 72-74

11 Polanyi, p. 5.

12 Tilly, p. 72; Tilly's of definition of Great Powers is slightly more inclusive than Polanyi's, see Tilly, p. 170

13 Calculation based on JD Singer and M Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*, Wiley, New York., 1972.

14 Kissinger, p. 93-94. Though Austria was neutral throughout the Crimean War, her ultimate entry into it on the side of the Allies led to the cessation of hostilities. Russia no longer felt bound to the principles of the Holy Alliance after Austria's betrayal.

15 A Avtorkhanov and M Broxup. *The North Caucasus Barrier : The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992. Russia engaged with the various empires and peoples of Central Asia throughout the century , in part, due to a fantastical idea of reaching India from the north. From 1825-1859 a

major effort was directed toward the Caucasus mountain regions of Chechnia, Daghestan, and Georgia at the expense of the Ottoman, Persian, and Circassian Muslims. The transfer of Caucasus troops to the siege at Sevastapol effectively delayed this campaign in this region until the early 20th century.

16 W Baumgart, *The Crimean War : 1853-1856*, Oxford University Press, London

New York, 1999. Baumgart's history of the Crimean War points out that the possession of the Crimea was never the issue, and the war was fought as far afield as the Baltic and White Seas and the Pacific Ocean. What was at stake was Russia's bid for suzerainty over Turkey, which was effectively stopped by the victors.

17 Calculation based on Singer and Small, as is the calculation below.

18 M Centeno, *Blood and Debt : War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 2002. Miguel Centeno's analysis of Latin American conflict struggles to incorrectly characterize Latin America as a region void of significant inter-state war, by dismissing the major conflicts: The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-70) and the War of the Pacific (1879-84). Nonetheless, historical attention to this region is admittedly poor. For brief, yet relatively thorough synopses see J Black, *War and the World : Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1998.; J Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*, Polity, Cambridge, 2009.

19 Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*, pp. 184-186. The First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913) were the best opportunities for contemporary military observers to see the effects of modern technology, including airplanes, before World War I. In fact, these wars between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey could be considered the first battles of World War I in which a million troops were involved in trench and artillery-based warfare.

20 Holsti, p. 142. Holsti excludes some conflicts, like the Mexican-American War, which did not 'impact' the system of mutual relations.

21 *ibid.*, p. 142)

22 A Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.; Mann, op. cit.; Tilly, op. cit.;

23 See M Foucault, *Power, Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, New Press, New York, 2000. Foucault's inversion of Clausewitz' dictum was: "politics is the continuation of war by other means" M Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population : Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 123.; see C Clausewitz, *On War*, Penguin, London, 1968.

24 Giddens, op. cit. p. 192. Michael Mann thinks this disciplinary power is over-rated in as much as this separation of military power from domestic pacification duties did not culminate until the second half of the twentieth century. Mann, op. cit. pp. 405-406

25 Mann, op. cit.; Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*.

26 Polanyi, op. cit. p. 7

27 The gradual political negotiation between local and state bureaucratic authorities within Prussia and the cities and towns of the old Holy Roman Empire are well outlined in M Walker, *German Home Towns : Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.; C Clark, *Iron Kingdom : The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006. Rather than being coercively suppressed by armed militaries, Blackbourn and Eley indicated that what would have been a traditional (aka British) liberal bourgeois class, actually allied with the *old regime* nobility to establish a 'party of order' that was mutually interested in suppression of labor and the establishment of industrial capitalism. D Blackbourn and G Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History : Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.; C.B.A. Behrens, *Society, Government, and the Enlightenment*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1985. indicated that this trend was not exclusively German, and could be applied as well to France.

28 Arrighi, op. cit. p. 54

29 Kissinger, op. cit.; P Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

30 Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*, p. 204

31 Mann, op. cit., p. 436

32 P Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Vintage Books, New York, 1989.

33 N Ferguson, *Empire : The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, Basic Books, New York, 2003.

34 This is still the dominant Marxist analysis of imperialism, in which capital cannot find enough domestic outlets for its surplus and must export it imperially. For the modern version of this theory, which corresponds with the idea of 'Military Keynesianism,' see P Baran and P Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital; an Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1966.; M Hardt and A Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000.; For an effective critique of this perspective, see R Aron, *The Century of Total War*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1954, pp. 56-73.

35 V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*, Foreign Languages Pub. House, Moscow, 1917; see also the Second International Socialist Congress, 'Resolution Adopted at the Seventh International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart ', <<http://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1907/militarism.htm>>, accessed 11-29-09 2009.

36 E Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875*, Vintage Books, New York, 1996.

37 A Chandler, *Scale and Scope : The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990.; J Schumpeter, *Business Cycles; a Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist*

Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, London,, 1939; E Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1987.

38 Ferguson, *Empire*, op. cit.; V Kiernan *The Lords of Human Kind : European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age*, Serif, London, 1995.; Moorehead, *The White Nile*, Vintage Books, New York, 1983. This was also the first time any civilization engaged in vacations and exotic tourism, which included big game hunting and anthropological research. see Hobsbawm, *Age of Capital*, op. cit.

39 T Pakenham, *The Boer War*, Random House, New York, 1979.; B Nasson, *The South African War 1899-1902*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.; H Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, A Harvest Book,, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1973, pp. 198-200.; Ferguson, *Empire*, op. cit.

40 Mann, op. cit., p. 34. Mann identified 6 ideal strategies of capitalist imperialism: 1. *Laissez-faire*; 2. National protectionism; 3. Mercantilist domination; 4 Economic imperialism; 5. Social imperialism; 6. Geopolitical imperialism

41 Kiernan, *Lords of Human Kind*

42 Ibid., p. 226)

43 Ferguson, *Empire*, p. 268)

44 Kiernan, p. 226

45 Arendt, op. cit. pp. 158-184; Kiernan, op. cit.; P Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred: The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to Freud*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.

46 Gay, op. cit.

47 S Freud *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Hogarth Press, London, 1963; H Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Sphere, London, 1969.

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50 W.H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power : Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, p. 128.

51 L Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, Harcourt, New York,, 1963, p. 84

52 Notable exceptions include Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1990*

53 McNeill, p. 211

54 M. R. Smith, *Military Enterprise and Technological Change : Perspectives on the American Experience*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985

55 McNeill, op. cit.

56 Ibid., 278-85

57 W Clark, *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006.

58 Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*.

59 Mann, op. cit.

60 Kissinger, op. cit.; Mann, op. cit.

61 Mann, p. 416.

62 Polanyi, p. 7.

63 Ibid., 11.

64 This causal analysis, that peace is the unintended consequence of finance, is important to world systems analysts such as Giovanni Arrighi who directly incorporated Polanyi's assumption into his own examination of cycling hegemonies. Yet, Polanyi credits the long peace to the balance of power system established in 1815, while Arrighi more correctly located the political underpinning of global trade with British hegemony, which, like the Genoese and Dutch world system hegemonies, was primarily naval based. See Arrighi, op. cit.

65 N Ferguson *The Cash Nexus : Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000*, Basic Books, New York, 2001, p. 277. When Napoleon III denounced the treaty of Vienna during a speech in 1866, James de Rothschild inverted Napoleon I's expression, "L'empire, c'est la paix" ("The Empire means peace") into "L'Empire, c'est la baisse" ("The Empire means the falling market").

66 Polanyi, p. 10.

67 H Herwig, *The Outbreak of World War I : Causes and Responsibilities 5th edn.*, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1991, p. 10

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